It’s twelve weeks today since January’s significant (if certainly not perfect) multi-party election in Iraq. And still, the party list that won the majority of seats has been prevented– both by the strictures of the US-dictated Transitional Administrative Law and by the manueverings of key US allies in the country– from being able to form a government accountable to the elected National Assembly.
The Bush administration, it seems to me, has just about completely “blown” the extremely valuable second chance it was handed, virtually on a plate, by the Iraqi voters back on January 30th.
The “first chance” Washington had to effect constructive social and political reform in Iraq was right after the US military victory back in April 2003. As longtime JWN readers will recall, I always opposed the decision to go to war. But once it had been fought, and apparently militarily “won”, I did not pursue a vengeful attitude toward its authors but instead advocated strongly for a reconciliatory and rehabilitative approach.
They didn’t take my advice. (Nothing new there, but I persist in giving it.) Instead, they pursued many of the most anti-humanitarian tactics of classic colonialist “pacifications”, particularly through their mass-detentions policy and their launching of extremely nasty “punitive expeditions” in Najaf, Fallujah, and elsewhere. All of which expeditions were chosen in preference to the option of negotiations that was very present in all or nearly all of those situations.
At least, though, the Bushies showed some commitment to the goal of democratic elections. On this blog and elsewhere, I spoke out and lauded that goal, despite the many evident shortcomings with the idea of trying to hold decent elections in a situation of continued military occupation and rampant public insecurity.
The majority of the Iraqi people showed great courage, and turned out to vote. And miraculously, through that act they offered the US occupation authorities in Iraq an extremely valuable “second chance”. Indeed, this second chance had even more legitimacy than the first one, since it was won through the US forces’ support for a fairly genuine exercise in Iraqi popular consultation.
Moreover, unlike the Bushies’ “first chance” back in April 2003, the second chance was something that democrats and reformers throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds could empathize with, and openly hope to emulate. It therefore had an extremely broad “resonance effect” throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds. (A failure of the ‘democratic experiment’ in Iraq will, as a result, have a much broader domino effect than anything the US suffered as a result of the failure in Vietnam… )
Much-needed political and social reform could, it was hoped, come through the act of voting! How much more palatable is that as an strategy, for everyone, than the idea of reform coming through military aggression?
But the Bushies are, I think, very close indeed to having blown this second chance…
Is it too early to make a definitive judgment on this? (I have been keeping the “Democracy denied in Iraq” counter up on the sidebar here for more than seven weeks now, and have always hoping to be able to take it down “soon”….)
The latest word on the AP wire tonight is that,
- Prime Minister-designate Ibrahim al-Jaafari [has] decided, some members of his political bloc said, to shun further attempts to include members of the party headed by [Iyad] Allawi, the secular Shiite politician who had served as prime minister as the country prepared for elections Jan. 30.
… Al-Jaafari’s list could be put to parliament as early as Monday, some of his bloc said. Others indicated the Cabinet announcement would be made Tuesday.
But as the writer of that piece, Thomas Wagner, notes: “Many such forecasts have proven wrong so far.”
But even if Jaafari is able to win parliamentary support for his list on Monday or Tuesday, how much real ability will his government have to govern?
This is an extremely serious issue. And much of the answer lies in the hands of the country’s US occupation administration. (I hope JWN readers haven’t for a moment been taken in by the Bushites’ protestations that they are “not an occupation force” in Iraq any more. Of course they are– both in fact, and under international law.)
An empowered, elected Iraqi government would chart its own course in pursuing questions of internal politics. Certainly, it would not have to listen to fatwas such as that issued by Donald Rumsfeld when, during his recent visit, he explicitly “told” the Iraqis what they could and couldn’t do with regard to former Baathists.
An empowered, elected Iraqi government would have full control over national resources and national revenues.
An empowered, elected Iraqi government would chart its own course with regard to national security. That course would most likely involve reaching agreements with the country’s neighbors, as well as with those portions of the occupying forces still remaining (or not) inside the country.
An empowered, elected Iraqi government could make its own appeals to whatever portions of the international community it should choose to, for help in attaining any of its national tasks. It would certainly not feel beholden to any diktats coming out of Washington.
… Meanwhile, we should note that much of the “story” that has been told by the mainstream US media about recent events in Iraq has claimed that the situation in the country got notably better for a whole period after the elections, and is only now threatening to get worse.
But that is actually a completely wrong view to present…
In fact, as I noted in this mid-March JWN post, the weeks immediately after the election saw a continuation or even escalation of terrible acts of mass terror aimed mainly at Shiite civilian gatherings.
What had gone down a little bit in those weeks was the presence of US reports on the scene capable of writing about that, and also perhaps, a little, acts that targeted US forces.
Juan Cole tried to argue yesterday that, “there is no particular connection between the guerrilla war and the political process. No one is blowing up a Shiite mosque because Ibrahim Jaafari hasn’t appointed a minister of public works yet.”
I think that view is seriously misguided. Perhaps it’s true that it is not the specific lack of a minister of public works that has contributed to the violence. (Although the existence of an effective and in-command ministry could certainly help both to offer jobs to people who sorely need them, and to provide sorely, sorely needed public services to people in beleaguered communities…)
But at a broader level, an empowered Jaafari government would also be in a position to use all the levers of national power to lead a serious national dialogue/reconciliation effort with all authentically Iraqi factions, and thus to leave the foreign jihadis almost completely without a viable local political base.
But there is so much, completely cockeyed (and highly ideological) political “spin” being put out about such issues by various suspect US sources… Like those who say, fatalistically, that “guerrilla insurgencies like this one have a ‘natural’ life-cycle of some 8-10 years, so we can’t expect to beat this one any sooner than that… ”
What kind of mechanistic baloney is that?
No-one has yet even tried a serious policy of proactively reaching out to engage a broad swathe of the Iraqi Sunnis in dialogue with the hope of cutting off the support of the foreign jihadis. Certainly not Allawi! He had (I think) clear choices to make regarding how to handle the insurgencies in Fallujah, Ramadi, Mosul, and elsewhere over recent months… And in every single one of those cases he chose escalation and violence over the option of peace.
It strikes me as quite possible, indeed, that Rumsfeld’s protestations that they “don’t have” an exit strategy from Iraq might well be untruthful. I think I’m seeing a US “exit strategy” being prepared right now. It basically aims at leaving the country without any effective government, then turning round to the US public and the world and saying, “Look, you see how ungrateful and basically ‘primitive’ the Iraqis are? We gave them every chance, and they blew it. It is just the re-emergence of ‘ancient tribal hatreds’ there in Iraq, and there’s nothing we can do except keep a few forward bases of US strike forces there in that lawless country, just as we’re doing in Afghanistan… ”
How else can you explain the notable passivity of the Bush administration with regard to the political challenges Iraq has faced ever since the January 30 election? The Bushites protest, on camera, that “Oh, we do not want to be intervening in internal Iraqi affairs…”
Baloney! They intervene all the time. Every day, and in every way… Except in the one helpful way in which it might make a real difference. Namely, by telling their cat’s-paw Allawi and their allies the Kurds that the establishment of an empowered and democratically accountable Iraqi government is a high priotity for the Bush administration and the world.
Have we heard them say that? Have we heard them say anything helpful at all about Iraq’s government-formation challenge?
Is there even anyone at all in Washington who has been placed in charge of the Iraqi empowerment file?
No, no, and no.
This passivity toward government formation in Iraq cannot be an oversight. It has to be wilfull. To what end, then? Does anyone out there have an explanation that makes any more sense than mine?
And how, more to the point, can the Iraqi people formulate a policy that will save their country from the ruin and fitna that currently face it?
Excellent column. But Helena, I would say that it’s safe to conclude that an “empowered and democratically accountable Iraqi government” is NOT a priority at all for the Bush administration. Really, it’s too much to expect the establishment of meaningful democratic processes in the middle of an occupation conducted by a powerful state with a long term strategic interest in the region.
Moreover the Bush adminstration is not interested in national reconciliation in Iraq if, as is likely, this will come at the expense of its own interests. For example, Iraqi President Talabani recently proposed an amnesty for Iraqi insurgents. The US reaction to this was swift and negative. They know very well that the first demand for reconciliation will be to draw up a timetable for the US to completely withdraw. And that is not what Bush has in mind.
Sorry to post too often, but this little item from Juan Cole’s latest is irresistible.
Based on a Zaman/Reuters report: “Adil Abdul Mahdi, an Iraqi vice president, has been in Washington for the past few days. This report says that US sources have revealed that he has been pressing the White House for permission to give the Ministry of the Interior to the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution. … Mahdi is said to have given the Americans assurances that SCIRI at Interior would not adopt policies that contradicted the security plans of the US military in Iraq.”
In “democratic” Iraq you have to get Washington’s permission to fill a ministry.
What is the point of discussing whether or not the Bush administration will empower the Iraqi “government”. As long as the empowerment or disempowerment of any part of any Iraqi “government” is a the discretion of a foreign occupier, the Iraqi government is by definition not empowered.
I think there are a number of possible explanations for the passivity of the administration in the face of problems in Iraq. At the beginning there was a great deal of denial of these, as the Atlantic article “blind into baghdad” noted a large set of people including military planners did an extensive list of potential trouble spots with some recommendations on how to deal with them. This would have course required a much greater committment of resources, probable inclusion of groups many in the administration felt uncomfortable with and quite simply a shifting of priorities that went against the focus on short term war plans. The whole balance of organization would have shifted and human nature is such that organizations tend to focus on the “sexy” details, because they are of little interest they don’t recieve much attention.
The decision was also driven by domestic political factors that was satisfied with an illusionary feel good committment on the part of the American people. One sees it now in the fact that conservative young Americans are not flocking into the military, they chose a rhetorical patriotism, image is everything. A president fully committed would have said from the beginning that this affair might cost us hundreds of billions, that tems of billions would probably have to be given to Iraq to rebuild a decimated infrastructure, and that there was significant chance of failure. But it was considered to difficult to sell the cost of real sacrifice to the American people, to some extent this is due to the childish dysfunctional approach on all sides of the political spectrum where if you are honest it is used by other sides to discredit because they of course have an easy painless solution. But it was required that Bush buck this and bring in the people with Lincolnian or Churchillian rhetoric which did not underestimate the difficulties, and called for an inner steeling.
This path was not chosen. Since then the path has been one where internal politics have been the key factor in vision. A honest hawkish approach would have used information coming from the press and elsewhere and urged people to lobby their congress and the administration for rapid and serious response. Instead it has consisted of denial, bad news has been regarded as unpatriotic and subversive, not an indication of problems to be addressed. The weakness of the system has been seen in things obvious and close to the hearts of the American people such as armor for the troops. We have found that the plants producing these items have not even been running at full capacity. So if even this politically volatile situation is ignored, then one already knows the response to other potentially desperate issues.
To me it is impossible to know whether the occupaton could have been significantly more successful. But to me it is obvious that we have suffered from hundreds of little cuts, things as mundane as a lack of Arabic translators, many of these cuts could have been avoided or the bleeding reduced if the pragmatic goal of success had been the priority.
But feeling good, easy success, avoidance of criticism has been. And this has led to a skewed hallucinatory reality. This is indeed the natural order of historical leadership. Quite simply all social structures from the family on up are usually based on distorted views of important events, a twisting which an objective view (nearly impossible for participants) finds absurd.
None of us are free of this. It is the first piece of “wisdom” anyone who wants to have a hold on reality must have.
I believe the current administration exhibits this tendency to a degree unusual for American governments. The human mind sees what it wants to see, the bright aspects of the elections led to euphoria in the president, not a calm guarded hope which stressed this must be developed with all seriousness, that with the opportunity comes risk, that failure could lead to disillusion that worsened the problem, with memories that elections have been held inn most 3rd world countries.
Victory was declared once again. As the “daily war news” remarks, “we sure win this war a lot.”
Well now reality is intruding once again, but the capacity for rationalization here (as in the economy, this is another place where the administration and it’s allies are blind to warning signs, another symptom of delusion) will once again assert itself. You are quite possibly correct. A numbe of people voted for Bush because they believed that unlike Kerry he could withdraw with “face” intact. Yes declare victory and go home. One of the plans of the right was being implemented a while ago, blame the media and liberals for undermining the effort, giving comfort to the enemy and turning a successful war into defeat.
This is the model used to “win Vietnam” where after a brilliant victory called Tet, the United States engaged in a glorious campaign under Nixon led by our loyal soldiers who were enticed (I know there is a contradiction here) to frag officers and non cmoms by the hundreds leading to the disgraceful surrender under Jimmy Carter who also imposed wage and price controls, imposed even/odc gas rationing in 1973, put in place energy proce controls, created stagflation, started to reduce the military in the early seventies and in many other ways managed to cripple the nation years before he was elected president.
The enemy is that dastardly!
Of course my opinion is that which is being heard frequently is that “George Bush’s greatest success is making the Carter (or Ford) administration look like the height of greatness.”
Re: The “passivity” of the Bushies.
Personally, I think it’s administration’s old SOP – they don’t know what to do and haven’t even been able to agree on what to try.
However, the latest reports may indicate that whoever is calling the shots on Iraq policy has finally reconciled himself/herself to the inevitability of playing ball with SCIRI and a explicitly Shia Islamist government.
And it sounds like SCIRI has been willing to make the right mouth noises to persuade the Bushies to accept the inevitable.
Sink or Swim With Abdelaziz Hakim.
Billmon:
In figuring out the mechanism of the Bush admistration behavior I do think you are correct, they do tend to freeze when faced with difficult and contradictory realities.
This is part and parcel of their consistent hesitation to push and persuade those percieved as “on our side” such as Sharon or the Kurds, I think you will find this basic approach to “reality” in many individuals, families and larger social structures.
It is fundamentally insecure, rigid and I’m sure there are all kinds of psycholgical discussions and models of these tendencies.
The hallucinated reality is a part and parcel of it, Bush has stated he ignores outside news and gets information from those who can be trusted, tead one of “us.”
You can see the degree of this state if you go to rightist blogs and read comments on the war. The situation is routinely compared to New York and Chicago which are sometimes “proven” more dangerous. The ability to edit out bad news, to regard it as “liberal” and from there subversive to “terrorist support” is amazing.
One is thankful for the relative sanity of the Bush administrations rhetoric in contrast. There is some hold on reality.
Now as far as I’m concerned there is a good chance that within a year the various illusions of the Bush administration will shatter. This kind of thing happens through history with varying consequences.
One thing I would like is that those who hold to the other position avoid the kind of personally pleasant perceptions that mark the right. For example someone here states they are cetain that Bush does not want democracy in Iraq.
This is quite a slander of character and ignores the more likely alternative. Bush does indeed want democracy there, he believes it will take the form he expects and wants just as he believes crony capitalism is free enterprise or competitive capitalism and that tax cuts will spur economic growth.
Such beliefs can be held quite sincerely and idealisticaly.
Indeed this is the human norm.
To doubt that Bush does not get a warm fuzzy feeling and glow of humanity when he thinks about these things is to “dehumanize” him, to deny him the human qualities that make “us” (those who don’t like Bush) special because of course our proposals and beliefs are based on the “true” love of humanity.
In fact of course it is the cynics and Machiavelians who cause the least harm when they go on their crusades.
What bothers me more is not the dehumanizing of Bush, but the dehumanizing of those who voted for him. I can think of all kinds of reasons why various groups voted for him, a number of the reasons are at least as intelligent and good as those of the majority of Kerry followers.
When I see individuals who talk of diversity so ignorant of the motives, experiences and perceptions of their fellow Americans tat they can’t imagine why a reasonable decent person would take a different position then we have the same delusional reality that about to smash down on the right wing.
I find your theory about the ability of, “an empowered Jaafari government” unrealistic. There has to be some belief in the gov’t to command the sort of moral suasion that is necessary to bring the insurgents to the negotiating table.
I think that any attempt by Jaafari to mend the wounds of tribalism will be undercut by the idea that he’s just a pawn of the American government and even though elected, there seems to be a belief that the process was rigged against the Sunnis; which helped shape the perception that the U.S. is really pulling the strings.
Given this sentiment, and the fact that there are tons of munitions and Ba’athists soldiers committed to fighting any gov’t, it seems quite likely that Prof. Cole and the fatalists (as you called them) are correct in assuming the guerrilla war will continue for the next decade.
Interesting entry Helena ! and interesting comments.
Personnally, I think that it’s extremely difficult to know whether the apparent passivity of the US is real or not, because we don’t know what they are doing behind the scene. My two cents is that right now they are actively engaged behind the scene :
1) Supporting the Kurds,
2) Trying to get a national union government including both Allawi and the Sunis.
Doing this their goal is
a) to avoid a too big tilt toward and Islamist state and one which would be too friendly with Iran.
b) to include more Sunis and thus get a more “legitimate” government, leading to some improvement in security. (Note that this second goal proves that the elections weren’t the complete success the Bushies claimed).
A great number of actors, from the Americans to the Kurds and the Allawist may be playing on time, hoping that Al’Jaafari won’t be able to form a government and that Talibani will pick another prime minister. That may even be true from some in the UIA..
The actual US government has never acted openly. Why would it begin now ? I think that the Pentagon doesn’t really care what kind of government Iraqis have, or don’t have. Their main goal is a strategic one : the installation of permanent bases in order to control an oil rich region. They also want to transform the region in a free market one, where their corporation can maximize their profits.
It would be better(aka easier, cheaper) if that was obtained with a legitimized Iraqi government and with less chaos. But they are ready to get to this goal at a higher cost if needed (aka if the resistance goes on).
All the comments have focalized on the political aspect of things until now. But what of the economic aspect ? This is the key. As is, the new Iraqi government absolutely need US reconstruction money. This is a considerable lever of power on any new Iraqi government : whether the new appointed government wants it or not, it will have to bent to the US because the Bushies have reduced the Iraqi state, the Iraqi enterprises and Iraqi infrastructures to rubbles.
I’m sure that the Bushies are believing in their “freedom and democracy” ideology. But for them it means essentially “free market”.