I went to hear Dennis Ross giving a presentation today. Dennis was the person who was in charge of the Palestinian-Israeli “file” for the first Prez Bush, and then for two terms of President Clinton. He is a fairly hard-headed person who pursues a manipulative and paternalistic approach to peacemaking, but I have to admit that a personal level I like the guy. When I was researching my book on the Syrian-Israeli peace talks of 1991-96, he was very helpful and gave me an intelligent and thoughtful interview for the project.
It was the way he talked about the Iranian nuclear program that provoked me into the thoughts that I blogged about here. But mainly, I’ve been thinking about what he said about the current opportunities in Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking.
He was quite clear in arguing that this time around, unlike in 2003, the US should absolutely not let Abu Mazen down. “We have an enormous stake in having Abu Mazen show that his way ‘works’,” he said at one point. I agree.
Well, there were many parts of what Dennis said that I quite agreed with. But there were other aspects that, in different circumstances I would definitely have challenged. For example, he talked about the need to have some kind of a monitoring mechanism for any hudna (ceasefire) if it is to work– but was talking solely in terms of having a US institution do the monitoring.
Hey, what about the Quartet, Dennis?
Well, he did mention the possibility of the “Multi-National” Force now in Sinai having a role in some of the monitoring. But that force is nearly 100% American at this point.
Also, he said that, “Just about everybody knows what the shape of a workable deal looks like: it looks much like the Clinton Plan of late 2000.”
Well, yes, maybe…. But as he noted, Prez Bush is not on board that approach yet. Plus, even if he were, he would still need to have a clear strategy for how to bring Sharon (or another Israeli leader) around to it as well. Or even, how bring the Israelis to comply with Bush’s own baby, the ‘Road Map’, for starters. Dennis didn’t mention any of those real challenges…
He did say– quite rightly, imho– that it would be counter-productive to start pushing Abu Mazen at this point to make public announcements that he accepts the concessions that would be required from the Palestinians under the Clinton Plan.
He said,
- Abu Mazen has to build his credibility with his people first. He has to get the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the area in the northern West Bank, and the Palestinians have to see that that has worked, before we start pushing him to articulate the position he needs to move to on final-status issues like Jerusalem, the borders, and the refugees…
Yes, fine. But how about Dennis articulating concrete ideas on how to get Sharon to where he needs to be, too? That, after all, will be the really tough nut to crack.
It occurred to me afterwards that the politics of peacemaking in Israel and Palestine today are very, very different from each other. If we are indeed talking about a final outcome that is something like the Clinton Plan– which is, in truth, about the only foreseeable formula, give or take a few dunums of land here or there, on which a viable two-state solution can even be imagined these days– then,
- on the Palestinian side, Abu Mazen is basically on board that approach, while much of his popular constituency still has to be brought around to it, while
on the Israeli side, Sharon is still far, far from even considering that approach, while the public-opinion polls consistently show that over 60 % of Israelis actually support it.
Complex, huh?
The situation on the Israeli side is even further complicated by the revolt that so many militant settlers have started to mount against the man who was once their father-figure, Ariel Sharon. Did you see Yoel Marcus’s piece in today’s Ha’Aretz, in which he wrote about the terrible threats that some settler activists are now making against Sharon– just as they made against Rabin in the lead-up to his assassination nearly ten years ago?
For now it seems, at some level, as though nearly all the domestic political pressure on Sharon is coming from the right. What on earth has happened to the Israeli “left”, and its ability to mobilize? I remember writing a slightly tongue-in-cheek article after a trip I made to Israel in 1998, saying that it looked as though the Israeli Labor Party was dead. Well, after that they had one further turn in power, 1999-2001; but that little wisp of power they enjoyed then now looks very much like a “last gasp”.
Yes, I know the Labor Party is not, strictly speaking, very much to the “left”. But over the years it provided a vehicle for many people wiith dedicated pro-peace records.
But now? G-d knows. I have many friends in the Israeli peace movement who say that Ehud Barak effectively killed the peace movement with his arrogance, stupidity, and mistakes. Did he kill the Labor Party as well? Where are the votes of all those Israelis who tell the pollsters that yes, they really would be prepared to accept a territorially viable Palestinian state and would be prepared to see the dismantlement of many settlements to help bring peace? Where is any large-scale public activism on their part? Why is it only the anti-withdrawal settler irredentists who mount large-scale street demonstrations inside Israel these days?
I’m not asking these questions rhetorically. I honestly want to know. I do know that, when I’ve talked with non-peace movement, or former peace movement, Israelis over the past few years they have talked about how hard it was for pro-peace sentiments to get a hearing while the suicide bombers were doing their heinous work there.
Okay, I guess I can understand that position. We have something similar that has happened here in the US.
But now, in Israel, there really haven’t been many Palestinian suicide bombings recently. Just a few, ill-targeted and primitive rockets coming out of Gaza. And meanwhile the Palestinians have had an election and Abu Mazen is standing there, asking the Israelis to make a peace that is honorable for both sides.
Where is the public movement inside Israel that might push the Israeli leadership to respond positively to that? I don’t see it. Let’s all just pray that Israel’s many fundamentally pro-peace people– whose lives are so many, many times more comfortable than those of their Palestinian neighbors– can get off their rear ends soon and help to make peace a reality.
The peace movement was great in the late 1970s. It was heroic in 1982. It sputtered back into life in the late 1990s, with the “Four Mothers” movement. But where, oh where, is it today?
What about the Geneva plans? I thought that was a hopefull development at the time.
The peace movement was great in the late 1970s. It was heroic in 1982. It sputtered back into life in the late 1990s, with the “Four Mothers” movement. But where, oh where, is it today?
In the government, and smart enough to realize that bringing down Sharon now will only play into the hands of the far right. A peace movement doesn’t have to be in an oppositional role, or to march on the streets, in order to be effective. Pro-peace Israelis are entitled to choose their own strategy, and right now, the tactic of choice for many of them is to cooperate with Sharon as long as he’s doing what they want and fighting their enemies.
Once the Gaza disengagement actually happens and the power of the settler movement is broken, then you might see a break between the peace movement and the government. If Sharon tries to end things there or doesn’t make progress in negotiating with the Palestinians, you’ll see people on the streets. Right now, though, Sharon is challenging the settlers more strongly than any Avoda prime minister ever did, and is taking the first steps in returning to the negotiating table, so the left’s strategy is not to make the perfect the enemy of a decent start.
(And no, two years ago I’d also never have dreamed I might one day defend Sharon, but he clearly isn’t the Sharon of 1982 or even 2001. If Abdelmalik Dehamshe and Yossi Beilin (not to mention Yoel Marcus, who has gone from being one of Ha’aretz’ biggest Sharon-haters to his biggest booster) are reconsidering Sharon’s role, then maybe there’s something there to consider. Remember that it took de Gaulle to get out of Algeria – maybe there’s something to the notion that only the right can defeat the far right.)
One more thing: A good way to predict what Sharon will be saying in a year is to look at what Ehud Olmert is saying now, and Olmert does support a Clinton-type solution.
Even people who support the Gaza disengagement seem to have sympathy for the Gaza settlers being dispossessed, and this has an effect. The settlers have sympathy and momentum.
The Israeli public seems to have become very cynical about the Palestinians and it looks like they are watching Abu Mazen long and hard. He is new as a leader.
Obviously, the important thing for Israelis is the new PA relationship with Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The first requirement of the roadmap is the disarming of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and both Arafat and Mazen have rejected this, taking the wind out of the sails of the peace movement. And possibly torpedoing the roadmap for all time. I’d guess that if peace comes it will not be under the auspices of the roadmap, but the Quartet may yet play a role.
In addition to disarming terrorists, the first part of the Roadmap says the “GOI immediately dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 2001”. Does anybody have a list of these? A map? A definition of “Dismantle”?
But now, in Israel, there really haven’t been many Palestinian suicide bombings recently. Just a few, ill-targeted and primitive rockets coming out of Gaza.
Yes, well, several years of Israeli offensive efforts coupled with the defensive security fence eventually took effect.
Where is the public movement inside Israel that might push the Israeli leadership to respond positively to that? I don’t see it.
That’s because you don’t want to see it: why should Israel respond positively to something that it had to bring about itself?
Further movement will require something Abbas doesn’t seem to have the stomach for: disarming Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the rest of the motley extra-governmental militias.
” on the Palestinian side, Abu Mazen is basically on board that approach, while much of his popular constituency still has to be brought around to it, while
on the Israeli side, Sharon is still far, far from even considering that approach, while the public-opinion polls consistently show that over 60 % of Israelis actually support it.
Complex, huh? ”
Not very surprising, and in fact didn’t somebody on this board expressed that fact before by observing that the Arab people/street are more extreme than their own leaders, while in Israel it is the other way around. Didn’t the poster get crucified by Shirin? But now coming from Helena this may be considered on its merits.
David
Dutchmarbel asked “What about the Geneva plans ?”
I do also think that the Geneva plan goes in the right direction, because :
1) The step by step process has been a failure.
2) Each side needs to make compromise.
The Geneva plans address the problem of the need to compromise; it shows these compromises are possible, because they have been negotiated between citizens of both sides. However the Geneva plans can only be of help once the wish for peace is widely accepted and real on both sides.
The negotiators of the Geneva plans believed that the mere fact the plans existed would prove the citizens of both countries that peace was possible and push toward it. It didn’t really achieve that, because when it came out, the Sharon/Arafat duel was still going on.
Can we say that now, with the election of Abbas on one side and Sharon’s unilateral withdrawal from Gaza things on the other side, things have changed ? Well, it’s difficult to say because
a) I’m not sure whether Sharon gives away Gaza hoping to keep the other settlements, or whether he really wants to begin a peace process.
b) As Helena pointed out : the Palestinian street is more radical than Abbas.
Anyway, after years of escalation and radicalization, there is now an opportunity window for peace. So the Geneva accords could well get more attention in the coming months.
On the 3th of February, our Swiss foreign minister (Micheline Calmy-Rey) has undertaken a 6 days tour in ME. On the first day, she has met first with Quorei and then with Abbas. Then she has visited several places in the Territories, including Gaza. On Sunday she will cross to Israel, where she will meet with other officials (but not with Sharon). It’s probably not a case if she was received by high ranking Palestinian officials, but not by their Israelian homologues. I’m sure she will push for the Geneva plans and try to make the most of the situation.
One possible problem is that the Geneva plans were devised before the wall construction and in the hypothese that the pre-1967 frontiers are still the basis for negotiation. But I fear that Sharon, supported by the US, will ask for much more.
Also, international humanitarian laws experts are unanimous : Sharon’s unilateral withdrawal from Gaza doesn’t mean that the IVth Geneva Convention concerning the responsibilities of occupying powers are lifted. What he is planning is only a redeployement of troops, not the end of occupation. For that to happen, you need : an independant and a viable state. After the departure of the settlers, however, Gaza will still depend upon Israel for the economy, the water etc… she won’t have air traffic access, nor other independant access to other countries, the money will still be Israelian.. The end of occupation will only be sealed with a global peace treaty.
( ref. for these last info there ; sorry it’s in French and on subscription)
Christiane,
The last Three years or so my focus has been increasingly on Iraq, and Palestine has been relegated to the periphery. However, I recall seeing last year at least one statement from a specific Israeli official who made it explicitly clear that the Gaza withdrawal is not at all about making peace. I don’t think I saved any of the articles, but I know I can get specific information and references if you like.
So far, from what I have seen and heard the Gaza “withdrawal” has consisted of a series of horrific “incursions” (during one of which the Israelis gratuitously and pointlessly destroyed a small zoo and killed the animals), massive house demolitions, and the indescriminate killing of lots of Palestinian civilians, including, of course, children. It looks more like a massive “last chance” demolition and killing orgy than a withdrawal.
As for Abu Mazen, he is as corrupt as can be. He has used money intended for the Palestinian people for his own personal benefit, including but not limited to building himself a fabulous villa. He will do whatever he believes will bring the most personal benefit to him and his cronies.
The Palestinians seem to like the Hezbolla model, that is a uni-lateral Israeli withdrawal without the consequent committment to enforcement anything. The same way that the Lebanese let Hezbolla operate out of southern Lebanon, you’d have Hamas and Islamic Jihad free to operate in Gaza. Border control would allow them to bring in really heavy artillery instead of the home made range-limited mortars.
The Palestinians are mentally unprepared to enforce anything against their own terrorist groups, and it is quite logical since they do not see them as terrorists. Even the murder of the Fullbright American delegation to Gaza has gone unaddressed, imagine enforcing crimes against Israelis… If I am wrong on the above I will be happy to admit my error in judgemenet.
David
We don’t fully know Sharon’s motive for the Gaza disengagement.
In practice, we can see that the combination of the disengament and the death of Arafat has brought about a flurry of peace negotiations, and that Gaza is on the table.
No matter what your point of view it is questionable whether the PA will be able and willing to prevent Gazans from again launching mortars and rockets against Israel. And what Israel will or should do about this.
Gaza was “on the table”, whatever that really means, months before Arafat’s death.
As for Sharon’s true intentions, there are explicit statements from Israeli officials regarding that. Of course, his actions do speak much louder than his or anyone else’s words, and so far his actions have been to put a total closure on Gaza (my friend, a physician who just completed a Masters in Public Health as a Fullbright scholar, is stuck in Cairo because no one is allowed into or out of Gaza), launch a series of particularly vicious attacks, step up the rate of house demolitions, and otherwise increase the torment he has habitually inflicted on Gaza.