In the early 1990s, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the successful staging of democratic elections in various spots around the world became the act of political ritual that came to symbolize the transition of whole nations from authoritarianism to democratic self-rule. In South Africa, the successful staging of the April 1994 election symbolized not just that, but also an amazingly peaceable transition from white-exclusivist colonial rule to a one-person-one-vote democracy in a situation in which the non-White South Africans outnumbered the “Whites” by about seven to one.
Iraq is not South Africa.
As I think I’ve written here before, there is one key similarity between SA-94 and what ought to be happening inside Iraq at this point: that is, a handover of the main reins of power from a previously ruling minority group to members of the majority group– hopefully, with good guarantees from continued democratic and tolerant interaction between all citizens.
But in South Africa, the negotiations over how that should occur happened before the elections. They also happened without the intrusive, massively violent, and polarizing presence of a gigantic foreign occupying army.
Yes, the SA “Defence” Forces under the apartheid regime were a terrible and grossly abusive blight on the lives of most South Africans. But at least all the people in those armed forces, from Defence Minister Magnus Malan down to the legions of coerced black “askaris” who worked under the control of the SADF were members of South African society who had a stake in the success of the transition to majority rule.
The same is notably not true of the US troop presence in Iraq.
I have expressed the hope in the past that the presence of the US forces would lead to a unifying– in opposition to that presence— of many of the different strands inside Iraqi society. Last April, that seemed about to be taking place– that was when there were anti-US battles raging in both Fallujah and Najaf and much of the rest of the Shiite south.
After that, the US occupation forces managed to “pacify”– imperfectly, but sufficiently– the mainstream of the Shiites. They did that using a very wily combination of both carrots and sticks. One of the main “carrots” was the promise made to Sistani back in April that the Constitution-writing body would indeed be elected, not appointed; and that was the origin of the elections planned for this Sunday.
(Sistani wanted to have them much sooner. But the Americans wanted to stall– I wonder why? They claimed it “would not be fair” to use the old ration-card rolls as an electoral roll, and that time was needed to constitute a new roll. Guess what? They never did that, and are going along with the suggestion Sistani had originaly made… So they could have had the elections in May if they’d wanted, and skipped out on all the past nine months of killing and violence.)
Then, the Americans prepared their massive– and, as they hoped, “decisive”– assault against the Sunni militant base in Fallujah.
I was really sad to see so many Shiite political figures supporting that assault. Moqtada Sadr, to his credit, never did.
I mean, I know that just about all the different strands of Shiite society have been hit very hard indeed by terrorist attacks from people alleged to be in or around the groups directed by the extremely shadowy– and possibly apocryphal?– Abu Musaeb al-Zarkawi. But still, the tacit or on occasion overt support that some Shiite leaders gave to the assault on Fallujah gave the US occupation planners a huge opportunity to try to deepen the Shiite-Sunnite wedge and even present the US forces as somehow “protecting” the Shiites’ safety and interests.
Oh well, soon enough we will see what effects the upcoming “elections” might have.
At many levels, they seem almost irrelevant. We know that their conduct will be deeply flawed– and also, that we won’t even be able to tell how deeply flawed they are, because of the total lack of transparency in all steps of their conduct.
The “main” contest that seems to be shaping up is that for “first place”, between the Allawist list and the Sistanist list. How different are the leading figures on these two lists? I used to think, significantly different– at least on the issue of how they would propose to deal with the US troop presence.
Now, I am not so sure. Trudy Rubin had an important piece in the Philadelphia Inquirer on Tuesday– sorry, I don’t have the link– in which she reported on recent conversations she’d had with many leaders of the Sistanist list:
- Until recently, leaders of the majority Iraqi Shiite community insisted
that the Americans should leave after elections in 2005. The party platform
of the United Iraqi Alliance – the Shiite bloc expected to win the largest
share of Sunday’s vote – called for a timetable for the withdrawal of
multinational troops.
Now, Shiite leaders have changed their minds. In a move little noticed by
the media, the Alliance has dropped the call for a timetable from its
platform.
The Alliance has not yet publicized the change; it took me days and many
trips to party headquarters to get hold of a copy of the revised version of
the platform.
But the policy shift reflects a growing fear in the Shiite establishment
that if the Americans leave soon, the Sunni Baathists who persecuted them
under Saddam might make a comeback. The Shiite community is also under
siege by radical Sunni Islamists from inside – and outside – Iraq who
consider Shiite Muslims to be infidels. These fanatics are trying to foment
civil war.
…
“If the United States pulls out too fast, there would be chaos,” I was told
by Iraqi Vice President Ibrahim Jaafari, one Alliance candidate for prime
minister. “We would expect Iraq might break up because we don’t have a
powerful government to prevent this from happening. So it’s difficult to
mention a date until the situation gets back to normal.”
Finance minister Adel Abdel Mahdi, another Alliance candidate for prime
minister, elaborated: The current violence, he said, has “created some
realistic thinking about the American presence.” At first, the Alliance
wanted “a certain timetable,” but then concluded that any U.S. exit had to
be linked to progress in fighting terrorists and providing security for
Iraqi cities.
The revised platform plank doesn’t mention withdrawal. It says only that
the Alliance seeks “an Iraq which is capable of guaranteeing its security
and borders without depending on foreign troops.”
Of course, the fact that so many leading figures on the UIA list have also been high-ranking members of the US-appointed, Allawi-led “transitional government” also means that the contest between the two lists in the election has less of a clearcut political basis and something of the aspect of a falling-out among thieves…
I think I come back to a judgment I made quite a while back– that the party system inside the Shiite community in Iraq is still woefully under-developed. That’s not surprising, given the terrible repressions to which the community was subjected by Saddam’s regime. But it does mean that the emergence of one or more smart, large parties with a clearcut anti-occupation and “nationalist” orientation that is capable of reaching out politically to members of the country’s other communities, as Hizbullah has done in Lebanon will probably take some more time.
And “time” seems to be just what the Bush administration seems quite happy to have a bit more of in Iraq, as it continues to pound the ethnic-Arab parts of the country back from the level of very decent human and economic development they had won by the end of the 1980s, ways, ways back into the Stone Age.
Time may, however, start running out for the occupation forces pretty soon.
There will almost inevitably be a large amount of political chaos inside the country after the elections, after the election results are “counted” and then, as will almost inevitably be the case, are strongly contested by whoever is not declared the “winner”. Or, there may be some more very unseemly horse-trading between people on the two “big” ethnic-Arab lists.
Should that post-election chaos be successfully navigated– and this is not guaranteed, then the next tasks of the new ruling group will be serious ones: to re-define (or, equally significantly, to choose not to re-define) the relationship with the Americans; and to write the Constitution.
Neither of those tasks will be easy. I wish I had more confidence that the people on the UIA list were up to them. Maybe the Sadrists were right to–in general– urge the boycoting of the election.
One thing I haven’t seen investigated: what are the class differences betw Sadr and the Sistani crowd? How did Saddam deal with them?
It always amuses me how “progressive” outsiders are convinced that they know better than Sistani/Hakim/al-Yawar/Allawi/Talabani what policies on Coalition forces withdrawal and other key issues best serves the interests of Iraq…they will be the last to admit it, but their policy prescriptions on many of these issues essentially differ little from al-Zarqawi or the Baath restorationists. To his credit, Professor Juan Cole, a leading critic of the Bush Administration, has not let his distaste for American policy in the Middle East get in the way of his understanding of Iraq’s true interests at this critical juncture.
It always amuses me how some people pretend that Sistani/Hakim/al-Yawar/Allawi/Talabani actually care about what serves the interests of Iraq.
Pepe Escobar has an article rich in detail at http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article7847.htm
Shirin, I wonder what your rating of Escobar’s report would be.
Ham– if your comment was directed at me, which your mock-magisterial tone does not make totally clear, then perhaps you could explain your reasoning at this point: their policy prescriptions on many of these issues essentially differ little from al-Zarqawi or the Baath restorationists?
It strikes me that maybe you haven’t been reading my stuff very closely?
Dominic– great link, thanks. The ATimes original has a good extra graf at the top.
Wellba– the class differences between Moqtada and most of the Sistanists were fairly extensively examined back in April 04 and June 04. Moqtada is basically a populist/street guy, with something of a flair for mass organizing. SCIRI and Daawa are much longer established but grew up as Iran-backed deep-underground organizations which makes for a different operating style and a different class basis more aligned with Shiite business owners, far as I can see.
I do, however, think that class issues get expressed and addressed differently within Shiite Muslim mass movements than in western societies. Can’t go into detail here.
South Africa?
hmmm… al-Zarqawi is no Mandela.
btw, my observation about the agenda of many “progressives” here was not directed at our cordial hostess nor any particular poster. Even some of the most viscerally anti-American contributors here are well informed. But, unlike Professor Cole, THEIR policy prescriptions would benefit the most Salafist and former Regime elements in Iraq and be ruinous to the Shiites, Kurds, Christians, Turkkomen – i.e., nonSunni Arabs, – who make up 80% of Iraq’s population…and, arguably, they would be disastrous to ordinary Sunnis as well, altho it is understandible that some of them are traumatized over losing their high perch in the Iraqi social order.
I am not a scholar or even a student of the Middle East. Like the 1930
“No, no, apologists for the Islamofascists protest: the Sunnis fight to free themselves from foreign “occupation!” Really? Think for a moment what would happen if America were to do as the Sunnis claim they wish: withdraw from Iraq. Into the vacuum would pour Shia and Kurdish militias, eager to avenge decades of oppression and the death of hundreds of thousands of their kinsmen–and the continuing violence the Sunni “insurgents” inflict upon their people Shia and Kurdish memories are long and they are drenched in blood. The Sunni’s make up 20 percent of the population. Who would win?
This fundamental fact is missed by all who blame the U.S. for the “insurgent” violence: the Americans stand between the Sunnis and the militias of those whom they oppressed for decades. Or, to put it another–bleaker–way: it is the American presence that protects the Sunnis, even as it allows them to attack and kill our troops. This is tribal warfare at its most tragic, most pointless, most nihilistic. The Sunni leadership brought it on and they have maintained it for no rational or legitimate purpose. And now, when the end is apparent and the futility of the cause is upon them–they want a place at the constitutional table.”
quote from Steven Vincent
DG
Oddly enough it is a little bit more complex. Take for example this piece:
Patrick Lang, the former Middle East chief at the Defense Intelligence Agency via http://www.tompaine.com/articles/bizarro_election.php
“The Sunni Arabs remained the real rulers of the country until the American invasion of 2003 and the Shia Arabs remained in the position of a despised
It seems to me that the presumption made in Helena’s post that the dropping of a demand for a timetable for US withdrawal from the UIA programme – a very important issue – is necessarilly due to a fear of the Sunni insurgency could be false. Juan Cole raised this spectre some days ago (that is, the spectre of a Sunni coup d’etat). Another way of looking at the question is perhaps that the UIA are currently bargaining with the Americans, in order to be allowed to win the election. Evidently, as matters stand, any objective observer presumes that the US is going to falsify the results, so that Allawi can win. However an Allawi win would not be convincing in Iraq, and particularly not with Sistani and his friends (think Ukraine). It may be that what we are looking at is negotiation. Of course, what a UIA government really does after the election is quite a different matter.
“Evidently, as matters stand, any objective observer presumes that the US is going to falsify the results, so that Allawi can win.”
Sorry, I didn’t realize quite how base the rhetoric here was going to be. My god, are there any websites for sane people? Then again, Mr. Miyagi was very clear when he warned…
“Man walk on road. Walk left side, safe. Walk right side, safe. Walk down middle, sooner or later, get squished… just like grape.”
Moderates and buddhists should be allowed to set up an enclave that nobody else can come into. Manhattan would do.
DC, the scenario you lay out shows little real knowledge or understanding of Iraq’s history or its social and political structure.
yankee, go home
We have a situation with no transparency, no monitoring, and no history of competitive voting. With even a basic understanding of human nature, could one imagine that there wouldn’t be widespread fraud? The voters are not even choosing individual candidates. They are voting for faceless “slates” that represent religious, factional and tribal interests. I can guarantee that wherever a particular slate controls the political machinery, it is going to win overwhelmingly.
This is not about Iraqis electing a representative government. It is about Sistani and the Shia’ hierarchy amassing political power to face off against the U.S. military power. Neither side wants to push the other into confrontation, but neither side wants to lose, either. What we will see after the election is what type of compromise (if any) has been worked out that maintains at least some viability for what is left of the Iraqi state. If there is no compromise a bloody and tragic situation will become even more so.
[T]he patience of the Iraqi majority about the crimes committed by the Arab terrorists, who are possibly being supported by some Sunni clerics, will eventually run out, and the world must then be prepared for their angry response.
— Hassan Hanizadeh, Tehran Times
Please learn something Shirin; dogmatic attack of any who oppose your views is part of the problem with the world, not the solution. The scenario of sectarian violence in Iraq isn’t just plausible– it is a stated goal. Please listen to Juan Cole and other people smarter than you with vision less clouded by envy and hatred.
“Please listen to Juan Cole and other people smarter than you with vision less clouded by envy and hatred.”
I submit that a careful reading of J. Cole will show that, while he may not be “clouded with hatred,” his contempt for the Baathist and his affection for the Shia is unequival, and, in my judgement, this contempt and affection “clouds his vision.”
To divide any complex society into ‘good groups’ and ‘bad groups’ is not a manifestation of intellegence (smartness)- rather, emotion. Cole is not an objective social science historian. This is why he is a regular on Public TV – he fills the so called “progressive” chair in their pseudo “balanced” analysis. This is to say he represents a political point of view (an agenda) not an objective social scientific analysis.
All of which is not meant to call into question his intellegence (“how smart he is”). I’m sure he has a high IQ and socred high on his SAT exams.
yes, one can make a strong case for the proposition that Professor Cole, a leading critic of Bush Administration policy in Iraq, blatantly favors the Shiite majority over those who were insiders when Saddam ruled, not to mention his obvious contempt for the foreign beheaders who have declared Democracy to be the enemy and vow to murder those who dare to vote on Sunday.
Tom, I quite agree with your remarks about Juan Cole’s prejudices and biases, and I do believe they cloud his judgment significantly. What I have found is that while his facts are good, they are sometimes incomplete, and his analyses and conclusions regarding Iraq are more often than not at variance with reality. I have been particularly disturbed lately to hear him more and more repeating the Bush administration line, particularly regarding the “insurgency” (sic).
I have a good friend who is an Iraqi Shi`i, a Middle East scholar, and who is also a good friend of Juan Cole’s. He likes and respects him a great deal, and as I do disagrees with him frequently, usually on the same things and in the same direction I do. So far in every case where we have disagreed with Juan he has not been the one who has proven correct.
Hammurabi, “those who were insiders when Saddam ruled”, as opposed to Shi’ites? What is that tortured phrase of yours supposed to mean?
So that you will not accuse me of putting words in your mouth, I’ll only say what I understand by your phrase.
I understand it to mean that Sunnis equal Ba’athists equal Saddam equal monsters, and all five million of them deserve everything that’s coming to them.
I understand you to say that this is Juan Cole’s idea and that it is a fine idea.
I don’t think the subtle Professor entertains thoughts like these, but he is at fault here, more than you. He invites your gross simplification, precisely because he hardly recognises any other kind of commonality than the religious kind.
Yours is only the reductio ad absurdum of Cole’s position.
If Cole was better able to recognise something of substance in a secular movement, (such as class or economic interest, or humanistic principle) he might be able to avoid the contradiction of labeling a secular movement (Ba’ath) with a religious label (Sunni).
You and he cannot have your cake and eat it.
Or, in other words, you cannot retroject from the present situation, where the religious structures appear to be the only ones standing (thanks only to the US aggression). You cannot retroject from this so as to deny the existence of a state principle that was separate from church and mosque in the past in Iraq.
I believe your view is a basic neo-colonialist one. You look out from the metropolis, seeing only natives with strange religious beliefs. Yours is the only economy. They are incompetent to have an economy, in your mind. They belong in the mosque. Everything else belongs to you, the imperialist. Blinkered in this way, you suffer no more moral scruples.
Dominic
My comment about “Saddam insiders” was precisely about that…Saddam insiders…not the entire Sunni population of Iraq…Even with a high level of intimidation, I wouldn’t be surprised to see many Sunnis casting ballots on Sunday…and, in any event, I fully expect Sunni leaders to be closely involved with the drafting of a constitution…after all, it would take only a 2/3 NO vote in 3 Sunni provinces to abort the new proposed constitution…and, no, I don’t see clerical domination of the new Iraqi government…nor a role of outsized influence by Iran.
Many here are quick to dismiss the importance of the vote…to your credit, imo, you have allowed for the possibility that a new dynamic might be set in motion…ironically, the person who has consistently taken this election most seriously is al-Zarqawi.
O.K., Hammurabi, so now it’s “Saddam insiders”, the narrow definition. How many would that be? One thousand? Even if you say ten thousand it would not be enough to justify stigmatising the Sunnis.
Anyway, this stuff about Saddam being a tyrant is just eyewash. The US has always supported tyrants, including Saddam, and is still doing so.
Iraq under the Ba’ath party was a welfare state with good education and health care facilities for Sunnis, Shias, and everybody else. The economy was state capitalist. All of this is being destroyed. The destruction continues long after Saddam has been captured and his sons shot down.
No WMD, no links to al-Quaeda. What is the McGuffin? Not Saddam, for reasons given above. No, it’s the destruction of a welfare state and the expropriation of all its prime assets (not just oil) by monopoly finance capital.
The USA itself is also undergoing this treatment, is it not? Russia, too. The US Iraq campaign is a message to the world: privatise, or this could be your fate, no matter if you are as wise and benevolent as the original Hammurabi.
The whole Sunni/Shia shtick is dust in the eyes to hide what is really happening. Wherever the imperialists go they throw up the same legend. Only the names are changed. In Somalia it was “clans”, remember? In South Africa it became an elaborate symphony, but now we are one. In Kenya it was the same but “umoja” (unity) triumphed, with the symbol of one finger.
Excellent analysis. Nevertheless I must have hope, even while bracing for the worst.
“stigmatising the Sunnis”
— imo, Iraqi Sunnis are just as entitled as Iraqi Shiites, Kurds, Christians, Turkkomen, etc.