Politics in Iraq and Palestine/Israel

Things are really starting to heat up in the election campaign in Iraq, while in Palestine and Israel there’s a lot of complex “pre-negotiation” politics going on on both sides of the national divide.
In Iraq, at one level, there is of course the continuing campaign against the election, being waged violently by (mainly) Sunni Islamists (Salafists) and some former Baathists, but with a fairly high degree of popular support from a Sunni population stunned and upset by the violence that the US and the Allawists launched against Fallujah and a number of their other cities.
But in addition, there is evidently a mounting campaign within the group of leaders and political forces who are contesting the election: and primarily between Allawi and the Sistani-supported United Iraqi Alliance.
Allawi seemed to wake up pretty late to the fact that he needed to contest this election politically and not just thru the application of massive violence, which is what he tried to do (Baathist-style) thru the end of 2004.
Now, suddenly he’s offering all kinds of goodies to the Iraqi people, including scholarships for their children to go abroad and study just about anything they want!
He also tried to tell the UIA people that they couldn’t use Sistani’s image on their election propaganda. But to no avail.
Then yesterday, Allawi’s people announced that on election day no vehicles “except government vehicles” will be allowed to travel on Iraq’s roads. Since there have also been many allegations that his people inside the transitional government that he heads have been abusing their positions in order to boost his election campaign, the travel ban strikes me as a very dangerous and unfair proposal, though it was announced on so-called “security” grounds.
So how are the UIA people and other contenders in the election supposed to conduct their election-day activities if they’re not allowed to drive?
Where is the outrage over this issue in the US media?
Whoever can credibly claim “victory” in the Jan 30 election gets to do two things:

(1) lead the deliberations on the country’s longterm constitution, and
(2) head another “interim” administration that will govern till the adoption of the new constitution and the holding of new elections under it– both of which are supposed to happen by the end of 2005.

This person may also, certainly, demand the start of immediate negotiations with the US over the speedy and total withdrawal of US forces from the country and their replacement with something else.
If it is the UIA list that makes–and holds on to– a claim of victory in the elections, this is very likely (but not certainly) what they will do. And Allawi? No doubt his US puppet masters would carve out a role for him post-Jan 30, as they have until now.
I make the point about about being able to “hold on to” a claim of victory in the January 30 elections, since it is extremely likely that, whichever of those two big contenders announces a “victory”, that claim will be strongly contested by the other side. And given the chaotic circumstances of the whole election process, both outside and especially inside the country, no credible, independent observer will be in any position to “certify” the election as “free and fair”, either way.
So if we have an election “result” that is immediately thereafter contested by the losing side– in a situation that is already one of rampant insecurity inside the country– what then?
I note here, too, that the opening of voting places in 14 other countries around the globe also complicates the issue, since (1) it allows many further opportunities for ballot-box stuffing, intimidation, etc etc., and (2) gathering and counting those votes– which I believe is to be done in Amman?– will take a number of crucial days beyond the gathering and counting of votes inside the country.
So expect those post-January 30 days to be ones of huge tension…
And then we get a winning list “announced”. And then?
If it is an Allawi victory that’s announced, I think we might expect a massive, Ukraine-style mobilization by Ayatollah Sistani’s supporters, contesting that announcement; and if things drag on perhaps the building of a strategic alliance between them and big sectors of the Sunni community.
(And remember: in the recent past, whenever Ayatollah Sistani has urged people onto the streets they have gone out there in the hundreds of thousands… or, millions.)
It seems to me, too, that– given the state of all credible opinion surveys conducted over the past few months– an announcement of an Allawi “victory” would have a massive credibility problem from the get-go.
If it is a UIA victory that’s announced, I don’t expect Allawi to be a gracious “loser”, either. In his case, though, he can command nothing like the kind of broad popular support that Sistani has. So instead of resorting to Ukraine-style mass action he might well react to the prospect of losing his present money-making opportunity (oops, sorry, make that “job”) by using all kinds of dirty tricks. And perhaps–though not certainly– with some support from Negroponte.
So anyway, in Iraq, I think the next important stage to watch is what happens after January 30.
In Israel/Palestine, meanwhile, Abu Mazen is trying to get his “internal house” in order, and so is Sharon. Today, al-Hayat has a really interesting story that includes the alleged text of the conditons that Hamas has presented Abu Mazen with.
I want to translate that and get it up here as soon as I can. But I have a busy day ahead. Including we have a new baby in our house! No blood relative of mine, but the son of a good friend who’s a single mom. They’re living in our basement apartment, and I’ve been helping the mom out quite a bit.
The baby was born four days ago. What a sweetheart! Heaven forbid that the US should still be locked in its present paradigm of arrogant militarism by the time this little cutie becomes an adult.