Haaretz looking at Palestine

Ha’Aretz has two interesting articles today on the Palestinian situation. One is an assessment of Abu Mazen’s situation, written by Rob Malley and Hussein Agha. Rob worked on Palestinian-Israeli issues in the Clinton White House and Hussein has been a longtime advisor to the Palestinian leadership. They are both astute and experienced; but of course like everyone else they look at things almost exclusively from their own point of view.
I’ll come back to their article later. First, though, I want to mention this piece, by Arnon Regular, that gives what I judge to be an unrealisticially “optimistic” gloss to the Hamas position paper I wrote about here, a couple of days ago.
Somewhat breathlessly, Regular reports that,

Hamas has distributed a document … in which the organization, for the first time in its existence, unequivocally recognizes the 1967 borders …

Not so fast there!
What the document in question actually expresses, in Article I-6, is this:

Commitment to the goal of dislodging the occupation, and the establishment of an independent, fully soveriegn Palestinian state with its capital in Jerusalem.

“Dislodging the occupation” is notably not the same thing as “recognizing the 1967 borders”, for two reasons:
Firstly, the meaning of the term “occupation” is not spelled out there. There are plenty of Palestinians who believe that Israel’s entire presence inside its pre-1967 borders constitutes an “occupation”, just as much as its presence in the West Bank and Gaza. (Plus, under international law, certain significant chunks of pre-1967 Israel were not allocated to the Jewish state in the 1947 Partition Plan and are therefore not unequivocally regarded as “Israel’s”.)
For the Hamas leaders to use the term “occupation”, without specifying “occupation of 1967”, leaves the extent of the occupation that they seek to dislodge still ambiguous.
Secondly, regardless of the extent of the “occupation” they seek to dislodge, they are notably not saying that that is the end of their demands. What they say still leaves open the possibility of them having a “two-stage” approach…
I think it’s important to clarify these points. The Hamas document is significant, both for its existence as a first, publicly available clear statement of their current position and proposals, and for a number of points of its actual content. Including (but not limited to) Article I-6. What they say in Art. I-6 certainly leaves open the possibility of them settling for a two-state outcome. And that is new and significant.
But what it does not do, at this point, is commit Hamas to accepting the existence of Israel within its pre-1967 borders, or indeed, any stated borders at all.
I think it’s very important not to over-interpret the advances this document represents. To do so would be to lead to disappointment and accusations of betrayal of trust when, sometime down the pike, Hamas leaders might well say, “Oh no, we never agreed to the existence of Israel inside the 1967 borders.”
It’s also important to read their statement as near as one can to the way they wrote it. These are people for whom the power and impact of every single word is very carefully chosen. One cannot understand them well or deal with them effectively if one does not read what they are saying.
Having said all of which, what they did say was still extremely significant.
And now, to the Agha-Malley article:

In the second part of their piece they write of Abu Mazen (whom both know well):

Abu Mazen enjoys a power that is at once nearly absolute and likely temporary. Unburdened by the need to cater to every constituency, his margin of maneuver is remarkably broad. But should the prevailing mood change, the U.S. fail to pressure Israel, or Israel fail to respond, the consensus that has swiftly formed around him will just as quickly evaporate.
…
Among potential landmines, two lie immediately ahead. The first is Israel’s disengagement from Gaza. This is not something he can oppose: Land is being turned over to Palestinians and, for the first time in the history of the conflict, settlements are to be evacuated. Gaza, free of Israel’s presence, can be rebuilt and serve as a model for the rest of the occupied territories. But it also is something he cannot afford to warmly embrace: Many of his people fear that with all eyes fixed on Gaza, the withdrawal there will be accompanied by a greater thickening of settlement blocs inside the West Bank, more Israeli construction in the strategic area of Jerusalem and continued building of the separation fence, all part of a suspected broader plan to impose long-term, de facto borders that will divide the West Bank into cantons. Balancing between these two considerations, Abu Mazen is likely to praise the Gaza withdrawal as an achievement that is part of the road map, keeping any coordination with the Israelis to a minimum and keeping the bulk of international attention on the West Bank. [I agree with that assessment ~HC]
The second landmine is one he knows to be in the offing: an Israeli proposal to establish a Palestinian state with interim borders in Gaza and parts of the West Bank. Eager for a political achievement, and obsessed with the imperative of institution-building, the United States and Europe are likely to press for his approval. Even some Arab countries, desperate for stability and for any sign of progress, can be expected to join the chorus. But what some see as an Israeli concession, Abu Mazen sees as a trap, an attempt to defuse the conflict, deprive it of its emotional power, reduce it to a simple and manageable border dispute, and defer a comprehensive settlement. He will strive to find a way neither to alienate important international backers nor break faith with his own deep-seated conviction that the proposal is a ruse – though how he can do both, at this point, even he does not know.
…
Over time, the fundamental challenge will be whether he can reconcile the numerous expectations he now embodies and channel the somewhat lukewarm backing he enjoys from often competing groups into active support for himself and his policies. In this sense, the election results both overestimate and underestimate his strength: The more than 60 percent who voted for him did not all endorse his platform, and the more than 30 percent who did not vote for him do not make up a coherent, unified, and effective opposition.
There are, too, a series of unanswered questions. What will happen if Abu Mazen cannot deliver what the U.S. and Israel require, and what will happen if Bush and Sharon do not produce what Abu Mazen needs? What if Abu Mazen is unable to reach a deal with Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Fatah militants, or if he reaches a deal but it does not hold, or if it holds but Israel continues its military attacks? What if the fragile political consensus around him breaks down or if violent infighting breaks out?
During his ephemeral tenure as prime minister in 2003, at a time when he enjoyed the support of the United States, the help of the United Nations, of Europe, and of much of the Arab world, we asked why, in the midst of such a crowd, he felt so lonely. He operated then without popular support, with substantial opposition, and in the shadow of a founding and interloping father. A year a half later, the father is no more and every significant Palestinian constituency now looks to Abu Mazen and relies on him. He has become the object of countless, often incompatible, desires. A protector and a savior, a transitional figure and a generation’s last best hope, the devil they know for some and the lesser of all evils for others. To Palestinians, Abu Mazen has become all of these, all at once. It has become crowded out there, and isolated he certainly is no longer. As he looks upon what lies ahead, he at times must wonder where all his constituents have come from, how long they will stand by him, and what he has done to deserve their abundant and often cumbersome company.

I know Abu Mazen far less well than either Rob or Hussein (though for a lot longer than Rob has known him). But I would say that in these last few sentences they capture both the spirit of the man and the challenge of his work.
In particular, I think they capture the fact that Abu Mazen is not a “natural politician”. He probably doesn’t actually like most of the other Palestinian politicians with whom he has to deal– or, many of their supporters. He is absolutely not “a man of the people”.
Of course, the Palestinians are still reeling from having had one of those single-handedly at the helm ever since the assassination of Abu Iyad in 1991. Which is why, for now, they seem generally agreed on giving this quiet, introverted, but visionary and highly principled man a chance to succeed.
Let’s see if the Bushies and the Israelis are also ready to do the same.