Pentagon board trashes “public diplomacy” efforts

Today, the NYT published a story by Thom Shanker in which he wrote that,

A harshly critical report by a Pentagon advisory panel says the United States is failing in its efforts to explain the nation’s diplomatic and military actions to the Muslim world, but it warns that no public relations plan or information operation can defend America from flawed policies.

The advisory panel in question was a “Strategic Communications Task Force” appointed by the Defense Science Board. (I think the DSB is the descendant of the historic DARPA agency, which gave the world the internet.)
So I rushed on over to the DSB’s website and found the whole text of the 102-page report right there.
[Update, 11/27: For some reason, the above link doesn’t work for everyone. (It still works for me, though.) However, The Federation of American Scientists has helpfully also put the text up on their site: here. Thanks to alert reader Allen for telling us about that.]
The report was presented to the folks in OSD–to, I think, Paul Wolfowitz– back at the end of September. But I suppose nobody, including no-one I know of in the blogosphere, was paying much attention to that arcane corner of the OSD (Office of the Sec. of Defense) back then. People were mainly focused on the US elections. So it’s taken till now for this fascinating report to get the attention it needs.
I skimmed through the whole thing really quickly this afternoon. It is actually, perhaps, even a bit “better” in many ways than Shanker writes. (In other portions though it’s pretty bad: pablumy, and filled with media strategists’ jargonizing.)
So anyway, thanks to my new skills in being able to copy large chunks o’ text out of (some but not all) PDF files, here are some of the parts I found most interesting.
By the way, if you want to go to the link I gave above and read the whole thing, I’d advise you to go to Chapter 2 first, which is where the most interesting criticisms of “public diplomacy” efforts up to the present can be found.
Okay, Helena’s annotated excerpts start here:

p.2:
Strategic communication [to be effective, will] … build on indepth knowledge of other cultures and factors that motivate human behavior. It will adapt techniques of skillful political campaigning, even as it avoids slogans, quick fixes, and mind sets of winners and losers. It will search out credible messengers and create message authority. It will seek to persuade within news cycles, weeks, and months. It will engage in a respectful dialogue of ideas that begins with listening and assumes decades of sustained effort.

US policymakers, being urged to “engage in a respectful dialogue with others”, and to “listen”?? Whoa, that’s truly revolutionary…
Well, let’s start right at the top, then:

p.3:
Nothing shapes U.S. policies and global perceptions of U.S. foreign and national security objectives more powerfully than the President?s statements and actions, and those of senior officials. Interests, not public opinion, should drive policies. But opinions must be taken into account when policy options are considered and implemented. At a minimum, we should not be surprised by public reactions to policy choices. Policies will not succeed unless they are communicated to global and domestic audiences in ways that are credible and allow them to make informed, independent judgments. Words in tone and substance should avoid offence where possible; messages should seek to reduce, not increase, perceptions of arrogance, opportunism, and double standards.

Like I said, some pretty revolutionary concepts there…

p.14:
The strategic environment has changed radically since the October 2001 Task Force report. We face a war on terrorism, intensified conflict within Islam, and insurgency in Iraq. Worldwide anger and discontent are directed at America?s tarnished credibility and ways the U.S. pursues its goals. There is consensus that America?s power to persuade is in a state of crisis. …
… Although many observers correlate anti-Americanism with deficiencies in U.S. public diplomacy (its content, tone, and competence), the effectiveness of the means used to influence public opinion is only one metric. Policies, conflicts of interest, cultural differences, memories, time, dependence on mediated information, and other factors shape perceptions and limit the effectiveness of strategic communication.

The author(s) then go on to argue that the US government is, essentially, seeking to confront a 21st century problem, quite inappropriately, with mechanisms developed back at the beginning of the Cold War, nearly 60 years ago…
He/she/they wrote about the importance of the broad “frames” within which policymakers tend both to view and themselves to frame issues:

p.17:
Frames simplify and help to communicate complex events. But like the Cold War frame, the terrorism frame marginalizes other significant issues and problems: failing states, non-proliferation, HIV/AIDS pandemic, economic globalization, transnational threats other than terrorism, and global warming. Often the terrorism frame directs attention to tactics not strategy. The focus is more on capturing and killing terrorists than attitudinal, political, and economic forces that are the underlying source of threats and opportunities
in national security.

They then go on to talk about what they see as happening: a deep revivalist movement within Islam that faces the US with challenges very different from those it faced during the Cold War:

p.18:
Islam?s struggle raises critical considerations for strategic communication:
? The contest of ideas is taking place not just in Arab and other Islamic countries but in the cities and villages of Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere.
? U.S. policies on Israeli-Palestinian issues and Iraq in 2003-2004 have damaged America?s credibility and power to persuade.
? The hostile atmosphere in which terrorists act is reinforced by religious messages,
sophisticated media strategies, and advanced information technologies.
? Regimes based on consent may be intolerant and oppose U.S. policies.
? More sophisticated influence and attitudinal segmentation models are needed.
? Strategists face difficult trade-offs in determining feasible choices and funding
priorities in using persuasive, cooperative, and coercive instruments of power.

Well, as you can see, this is all deeply subversive stuff. (I wonder what Paul Wolfowitz thought when he read it?)
That part above was all from either the Introduction, or Ch. 1. In Chapter 2 it gets better:

p.34-36:
Our thorough inability to grasp the final dynamic changes that led to the end of the Cold War should be unsettling to us, but after all, the outcome was also a total victory. So the Cold War template was almost mythically anointed in the decade before 9/11. Thus, with the surprise announcement of a new struggle, the U.S. Government reflexively inclined toward Cold War-style responses to the new threat, without a thought or a care as to whether these were the best responses to a very different strategic situation.
…
There is an expectation that, like the Cold War, the U.S. will naturally create enduring alliances and coalitions. Moreover, if the Cold War could be described as a struggle against one form of totalitarianism ? Marxist-Leninism ? so too there is a desire to describe the ?War on Terrorism? as a struggle against yet another form of totalitarianism ? this time in the form of a radical Islamist vision. Thus the problem is presented as one of how to confront and eventually defeat another totalitarian evil. And as with the Cold War, many now also
declare that it is incumbent on the U.S. to assume leadership in this struggle.
But this is no Cold War [Emphasis in the original there]. We call it a war on terrorism ― but Muslims in contrast see a history-shaking movement of Islamic restoration. This is not simply a religious revival, however, but also a renewal of the Muslim World itself. And it has taken form through many variant movements, both moderate and militant, with many millions of adherents ― of which radical fighters are only a small part. Moreover, these movements for restoration also represent, in their variant visions, the reality of multiple identities within Islam.
If there is one overarching goal they share, it is the overthrow of what Islamists call the ?apostate? regimes: the tyrannies of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Jordan, and the Gulf states. They are the main target of the broader Islamist movement, as well as the actual fighter groups. The United States finds itself in the strategically awkward ? and potentially dangerous ? situation of being the longstanding prop and alliance partner of these authoritarian regimes. Without the U.S. these regimes could not survive. Thus the U.S. has strongly taken sides in a desperate struggle that is both broadly cast for all Muslims and country-specific.
This is the larger strategic context, and it is acutely uncomfortable: U.S. policies and actions are increasingly seen by the overwhelming majority of Muslims as a threat to the survival of Islam itself. Three recent polls of Muslims show an overwhelming conviction that the U.S. seeks to ?dominate? and ?weaken? the Muslim World. Not only is every American initiative and commitment in the Muslim World enmeshed in the larger dynamic of intra-Islamic hostilities ? but Americans have inserted themselves into this intra-Islamic struggle in ways that have made us an enemy to most Muslims.
Therefore, in stark contrast to the Cold War, the United States today is not seeking to contain a threatening state/empire, but rather seeking to convert a broad movement within Islamic civilization to accept the value structure of Western Modernity ? an agenda hidden within the official rubric of a ?War on Terrorism.?
But if the strategic situation is wholly unlike the Cold War, our response nonetheless has tended to imitate the routines and bureaucratic responses and mindset that so characterized that era. In terms of strategic communication especially, the Cold War emphasized:
? Dissemination of information to ?huddled masses yearning to be free.? Today wereflexively compare Muslim ?masses? to those oppressed under Soviet rule. This is a strategic mistake. There is no yearning-to-be-liberated-by-the-U.S. groundswell among Muslim societies ? except to be liberated perhaps from what they see as apostate tyrannies that the U.S. so determinedly promotes and defends. [Emphasis in original.]
? An enduringly stable propaganda environment. The Cold War was a status quo
setting that emphasized routine message-packaging ? and whose essential objective was the most efficient enactment of the routine. In contrast the situation in Islam today is highly dynamic, and likely to move decisively in one direction or another. The U.S. urgently needs to think in terms of promoting actual positive change.
? An acceptance of authoritarian regimes as long as they were anti-communist. This could be glossed over in our message of freedom and democracy because it was the main adversary only that truly mattered. Today, however, the perception of intimate U.S. support of tyrannies in the Muslim World is perhaps the critical vulnerability in American strategy. It strongly undercuts our message, while strongly promoting that of the enemy.
…
p.39:
A truly global network is reshaping politics, diplomacy, warfare ? all social interaction. Just one example: the ability of a blogger in a conflict zone to capture a digital image of an atrocity, upload it, paste it on a webpage, and have it available to millions in minutes is a startling development.
Here is just one example of information age implications for old-style info-agency organization. While we focus inward our adversary is focusing outward, truly reaching and motivating those they hope to enlist against us. The U.S. has always operated from the proposition that in the ?war of ideas? and the competition of ideologies, one form of governance and society functions best when the bright light of free-flowing information is pulsing ? among free and democratic societies ? while another ? the tyrannical and fascistic ? functions with difficulty, if at all, under those circumstances. Yet the paradox today is that our enemy is thriving in an environment of free and open information flows. [HC emphasis] Thus our challenge is to transcend Cold War clich