The first 1,000

It is a somber moment. It happened today: according to AP, 999 US service members have now died in Iraq, along with three civilian employees of the military. Total: 1,002 families bereaved by the violence of a war that was totally unnecessary.
And of course, there are also the far, far larger number of families bereaved inside Iraq, and the smaller numbers of families bereaved in all the “coalition” and other countries involved in the Cheney-Halliburton adventure in Iraq.
One big question: Why doesn’t John Kerry make exactly this same point, about the unnecessary–indeed, fraudulent–nature of the whole Iraq war project?
I saw him on ABC News tonight. He expressed appropriate sympathy with the families. Then he went on to say something quite anodyne like “We will carry on fighting for what they fought for.” For Bush’s version of manifest destiny and fat contracts for Cheney’s chums: that’s what you want to fight for, John Kerry?? Shame on you.
Anyway, I don’t want to expend energy lamenting John Kerry’s tin ear on the war. I wanted to write a bit about the cyclical structure of the violence in Iraq these days, and the responsibility of the US to participate in–indeed, to lead–a major turn toward de-escalation…


Back on August 18, I wrote here that I thought the people running the US “presence” in Iraq would probably agree with me that:

    It is in the interests of the US (and also, I would argue, the Iraqis) that the plan to prepare elections go ahead as smoothly, successfully, fairly, and legitimately as possible

Gosh, I hope my assumption that Negropontra and his generals could agree with that point was valid? Honestly, after their behavior over the intervening three weeks, I’m not so sure.
But I really cannot believe that they would be so lacking in understanding as not to see the consequences of allowing the election-planning process to go off the tracks? Especially after they have had ample opportunity to,

    (1) see the amazing political power of Ayatollah Sistani, who simply by stepping into Najaf was able to halt the entire dynamics of confrontation there, and
    (2) understand the extreme importance that Sistani and most other Iraqis attach to the concept of the speedy holding of elections.

So why on earth are we now seeing not only the braggadocio-laden rhetoric of Lt.-Gen Thomas F. Metz, as reported by the AP on Sunday (and written about here, on JWN), but also the accompanying bully-boy actions undertaken by the US military like the bombing (yet again) of Fallujah, and the provocative deployment of tanks and armored vehicles into the heart of Sadr City??
As I have asked here before: With what body part are the people who plan these things doing their “thinking”? It sure as heck ain’t their brains…
Yesterday, I wrote a column for the CSM–it’ll be in Thursday’s paper–in which I made some of these same points. I was trying to force the attention of my readers away from the never-ending, headline-hogging tales of war and fighting back to the essential issue of how can the plan to hold a nationwide election in Iraq before next January 31 actually be implemented?
I called for the main mission of the US military in Iraq to be transformed from being bullying control freaks (okay, I used politer language there) into becoming the midwives of the democratic process in the country.
It can still–just–be done, I think. Though it would take a massive change of heart and of doctrine from Gen. Metz and his superiors. But what the heck are we paying these guys their handy generals’ salaries for, if not to be the servants of the American people???
And now, before my column has even been published, Kofi Annan has been making almost the exact same argument!
I can’t find the whole text of his remarks, which were made in a report he gave to the Security Council today.
Here’s what Larry Fine of Reuters reported about it this evening:

    Annan said the security environment in Iraq had not improved much since the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003 [somewhat of an understatement there, I’d say–HC] and he urged the United States to rely more on the political process than on force.
    “It must be recognized that the problem of insecurity can only be addressed through a political process,” he said. “This requires a commitment to stop relying solely or mainly on threats or actual use of armed force and to pursue determined and genuine efforts” to address concerns.
    Annan said security continued “to pose a very profound challenge for the successful achievement” of voter registration and polling for Iraq’s first free elections.
    “In addition to severely disrupting everyday life for Iraqis, the ongoing violence could undermine confidence in the transitional political process, making it more difficult to create the conditions necessary for the holding of elections in January 2005,” he added.

I almost couldn’t have said it better myself, Mr. A!
Well, y’all will have to wait till Thursday to see what I did say on the topic. But in the meantime, I thought I’d share with you some of the background materials I found while I was researching and thinking on the subject of the preparations for what are planned to be Iraq’s first truly democratic elections for a very long time indeed. One might indeed say, “ever”, since the last lot were held in the time of British control there.
I was quite pleased to see how much progress has been made already in planning the elections. The main person organizing all this has been Carina Perelli, the head of the Elecoral Assistance Division at the UN Dept of Political Affairs’ (DPA/EAD), who has been to Iraq two or three times this year for in-depth consultations.
Early in the year, she and her team started sketching out a timetable and workplan. Sistani always wanted a guarantee the elections could be held in 2004. But Perelli and the UN’s Lakhdar Brahimi infomed him that just from a logistical point of view that would not be possible.
They did, however, say that it should be possible to hold them before 31 January 2005. So that is now the target date everyone’s looking at.
One thing that makes this feasible at all is that–unlike in Afghanistan and in many other post-conflict elections– in Iraq there is a pretty up-to-date data base from which to build the voter rolls. This comes from the ration-card system, according to which everyone in Iraq was registered with a local ration-distribution office. With that as a basis for the voter roll, the roll can be updated by the addition of returned exiles and newly-come-of-age voters, and culled of the dead… But that’s still a whole lot easier than starting from scratch!
In early June, Perelli and her team announced the names of the seven members of the Independent Electoral Commission and the Chief Electoral Officer who will be the person managing the whole process (under the guidance of the IEC).
As far as I can tell, the list of names was not controversial inside Iraq. (Someone please correct me if I’m wrong??)
At the end of June, the UN arranged a special, intensive, two-week training session for those eight people, in Mexico. This little article, from New Zealand, July 9, tells us:

    Officials serving with Iraq’s Independent Electoral Commission have concluded two weeks of intensive training in Mexico City, … the United Nations announced today.
    The seven Commissioners and a Chief Electoral Officer… received training on a range of issues, including the standards and principles of credible elections, approaches for dispute resolution and voter registration. Other areas covered were the registration of political parties, voter education campaigns, and procedures for polling, counting and tabulating results.
    Presenters included staff of electoral institutions from around the world – Argentina, Mauritius, Mexico, Spain, Sweden, the United States, Yemen and the occupied Palestinian territory – as well as UN experts and staff from other international organizations.
    The training was provided by the UN in partnership with Mexico’s Federal Institute of Elections.

Meanwhile in mid-June, Carina Perelli gave a very informative press briefing in New York City, from which you can learn a lot about the election-prep plans.
And more recently, the interesting Kurdish website Doza Me carried a September 2 piece from Reuters that started with this:

    Iraq’s electoral commission is confident polls will go ahead in January, even if it means using Saddam-era ration cards to help draft voter lists and shipping ballot boxes in from Mexico.
    “We face great challenges but we are trying our best. We have a lot of work to do but postponing the elections beyond January 31 does not even pass our minds,” said Farid Ayar, one of eight members of Iraq’s Independent Electoral Commission.[Well, actually seven, as noted above… No matter.]
    … As he spoke, a thudding explosion — probably from a mortar bomb — was heard outside the complex. Insurgents frequently fire mortar bombs at the Green Zone, which also houses the U.S. embassy.
    “They can do whatever they want with their bombs but we are not moving the elections,” an unfazed Ayar said, sipping tea…

Anyway, go read the rest of that piece. Or go to Perelli’s June press briefing, linked to above, for a really detailed account of the election plans.
Meanwhile, I’m looking forward to reading the whole text of Annan’s report to the Security Council– also, to a presentation that Perelli’s due to give at the US Institute of Peace on Thursday.
There is such a strong desire on the part of most Iraqis to have these elections, and to have them be successful, free, and fair!
But will the US military and their political bosses let that happen? I guess we’ll soon see.
One thing I’m pretty darn’ sure of, though. If the election plans are derailed by further escalations of violence from all sides–including the US– then the US military will surely rack up its next 1,000 war deaths far more quickly than the first 1,000…
Do you think the Bushies just can’t see that? Or they don’t want to see it? Or what?

8 thoughts on “The first 1,000”

  1. I’m rather pessimist on this issue. I don’t think that the Bushies really want free elections in Iraq, because then the Iraqi would be at the commands and they won’t allow large US military bases to remain in Iraq. The US will use the pretext of insecurity in order to prevent full scale elections and to further “justify” its presence in Iraq. The actual heavy handed military actions in Falludja and Sadr city are part of the Bushies strategy to prevent fair elections in whole Iraq.
    Suppose that elections are held in most Shiites and Kurdish parts of Iraq, but not in insecured places(a possibility considered by commander Metz), how will the other parts of the country be represented ? If the other parts aren’t allowed to vote, the future partially elected government will not be more legitimate than this actual one. So the guerilla will go on.

  2. Helena Cobban, Early on, there was some understanding about the necessity of elections reached between Sistani, the Alavid Shiite, and Barzani et al from mythical pluralistic secular Kurdistan. When the Khomeini Theocrats got together with Turkey’s PM Erdogan, last August, declaring Kurds “Terrorists”, did they also decide that elections were dangerous for each with their Kurdish minorities? When the Independent Electoral Commission was announced did Perrelli give out any background about how these seven members were vetted? Were they vetted by Sistani and Barzani, Jimmy Carter, Thug Allawi, Three Sticks Bremer? I.e., who are their masters? Findow Heck

  3. Findow, as far as I can tell, the IEC members and the CEO were selected by Brahimi and Perelli from lists of names that they’d gathered from many, many Iraqis. I don’t think Bremer had much to do with it.

  4. Helena,
    You don’t become a general military officer because of your expertise in running or encouraging elections.
    If US policy was run by people who thought honest elections in Iraq were a priority, they would have taken place by now. Indeed, many, many months ago.
    The generals are paid to think of controlling things, and stopping, destroying or containing enemies. It’s not fair to blame them for the failures of a policy that makes them key components of policy.

  5. SM– you are quite right. Point well taken. When I said, “Gen. Metz and his superiors” I was clearly thinking of the suits who give the generals their marching orders but I shd have spelled that out.
    In my CSM piece, I note the encouraging precedent provided by Namibia, where the S. African military had been running an extremely brutal (and illegal) military occupation for many years… Eugene de Kock and other participants in that occupation have made many revelations about just how many atrocities they committed there… BUT, in 1989, once the SA government had decided it needed to “deal” with SWAPO and agreed to go along with the long-dormant election plan for the country, the role of the military was transformed overnight from running the brutal occupation into preserving the peace for the countrywide elections.
    (Apparently the S. Africans expected that their allies inside Namibia could win the election. But they and SWAPO both agreed to abide by the results… The great thing was that after the results went strongly in favor of SWAPO, Pretoria kept to its side of the agreement… and that then sort of paved the way for the opening to their own ANC, which came hot on the heels of the SWAPO victory.)
    The U.S. military CAN make that same transformation–if ordered–I am sure. It’s the suits who make the decisions that I am much more worried about.

  6. The big casualty issue isn’t the 1,000 dead. It is the 1100 wounded in August. There is a fundamental and disturbing shift in the war.

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