Iraq’s four Grand Ayatollahs get it together?

16 thoughts on “Iraq’s four Grand Ayatollahs get it together?”

1. Helena,
   I read your Christian Science Monitor article earlier this month on the prospects for the elections, and on the counterproductive nature of the US escalation, especially in Fallujah and Najaf. Although I think you are likely right that the escalation is a grave mistake, respectfully, I have to disagree with your overall analysis of the situation, at least with respect to the Sunni “no-go” cities, and especially Fallujah.
   I do not believe that the main problem in getting these cities on board with the election process is the heavy-handed US military tactics. Nor do I think that de-escalation in itself will be successful in getting them to participate – although it certainly might help. The problem is that, whether under US assault or not, there are just too many violent factions in these cities who are fundamentally opposed to the whole US-designed and UN-backed transitional process, including the elections. They have no intention whatsoever of participating in these elections, and they are determined to bring it about that no one else participates either. While these groups may or may not represent the majority of the Iraqis in the “no-go” cities, they appear to have the upper hand right now, and are exerting sufficient force and intimidation to get their way.
   Of course, the most frustrating aspect of this whole story from the point of view of someone trying to understand it here in the US is that we have very little information about the actual political situation inside the Sunni “no-go” cities. We know little about who the different forces are, about how powerful they are relative to one another, or about what their agendas are beyond the limited public statements they occasionally make. We know so little because these cities have become so dangerous in recent months that reporters simply can’t get in there to get this information. Reporters who attempt to work through translators and mediators to develop contacts in these cities have found themselves at risk of having these mediators turn on them and hand them over to resistance. Many have acknowledged that they have simply given up, which is understandable, given the experiences of the hostages. The last really good piece of reporting on Fallujah, for example, was Nir Rosen’s outstanding seven-part series in the Asia Times back in July. Since then, Fallujah’s internal politics have become almost a complete mystery. I try to read everything I can find on the situation in Iraq, but there is not much to go on, so I realize that my analysis is highly fallible.
   You suggested in your Monitor article that the main problem is that the US is determined to re-establish military control over these cities, and cited General Metz’s comments in support of your interpretation of US intentions. And you argued quite sensibly that it shouldn’t matter who is in control of the cities, as long as whoever it is can provide the security for the residents of those cities to participate in the elections. It should not matter at this point whether the US-Allawi government is in control of these cities, or the cities are under the control of local sheikhs or notables, and the militias loyal to them. We just want people to be able to vote.
   But again, as I see it, the basic problem is that so far we can tell, most of the leadership in those communities is currently advocating a boycott of the elections. Many of the rejectionists are simply not in favor of the UN-backed transitional process, and will not participate in it under any circumstances. And we have seen in recent weeks that some Sunni sheikhs who have made conciliatory gestures toward the government, or who have attempted even to develop ties with Shiite groups, have been assassinated.
   Some of the leaders have said that they will participate in elections, but only following a complete US withdrawal, not only from their cities, but from the entire country. This is, of course, at odds with the position of the UN, which wants the US to increase security and argues that it will not be able to manage the elections without that security. And I have to agree that it seems unlikely that a US withdrawal would suddenly right the security situation, and set the country on a peaceful path to democracy. There is no one group in Iraq with the power to govern the country and provide security, nor even a potential collection of groups with the ability to work together to govern the country and steer it through the transition to a stable democratic government. There are too many competing, violent factions and sub-factions that would use the vacuum created by the absence of force to wreck the elections, and to attempt to advance their own agendas through violence. And I don’t think my pessimistic judgment involves a mere blind prediction of civil war; there is already civil war, but it’s full expression is muted somewhat by the presence of US forces.
   Despite Metz’s earlier comments, here is what I take to be the current US reading of the situation, based on what we hear from Washington, Baghdad and the Defense Department these days: the US and Allawi believe that there are leaders in the no-go cities who can indeed be worked with, but that right now these cities are under a virtual reign of terror by the most violent, rejectionist forces, and that any leaders advocating compromise of any kind, or a willingness to participate in the elections, is marked as a collaborator and a target for murder by these rejectionists. Similarly, any ordinary people in Fallujah who are even remotely inclined to vote in the elections will be far too frightened to do so. They are likely to be attacked or blown up by a car bomb while they are standing in line.
   I don’t believe US actions in recent weeks are aimed at re-establishing US or Allawi government control over the no-go cities – especially not in Fallujah – although that might have been their intention earlier in the summer. They know that resistance to US occupation in these cities is too broad-based to make that a realistic possibility. But the US believes – perhaps mistakenly – that if they can knock out the most extreme rejectionist forces, the ones who are likely to try to kill anyone who tries to vote in the election, they can turn the political tide in the city – not enough that the cities’ leaders would allow a re-occupation of the cities by US forces, but enough that the leaders would be willing to provide their own security for UN and other international representatives to get into the cities to supervise the elections. What we need is for local sheikhs and tribal leaders, and the militias they control, to say that they are willing to participate in the elections, and are willing use their own militias to provide security. But in the current environment those willing to participate do not have the upper hand, and are worried that if they express a willingness to cooperate they will find themselves hanging from a bridge the next morning.
   I suspect the US is putting so much emphasis on Fallujah because it is the center of the most violent and extreme, uncompromising jihadist factions of the resistance – represented by Zarqawi and his ilk – and they hope that they can at least limit the spread of those factions by attacking them in their stronghold. They may also hope that turning the tide in favor of elections in the symbolic Sunni center of the resistance will have a political impact on other Sunni cities.
   The US problem in Najaf, as I see it, was that al-Sadr is a very difficult figure to read. At times he has expressed a willingness to participate in the elections along with his followers; at other times not. If the Mahdi Army had been able to secure control of Najaf, and then decided they did not want to participate in the elections, they could have used force and intimidation to bring Najaf “off-line” as far as voting goes. And not having Najaf participate would be even more devastating to the legitimacy of the elections than not having a city like Fallujah participate. Najaf is the religious heart of the Iraqi Shiite community. If the US had not attacked the Mahdi Army and ceded Najaf to Sadr, it is possible that the latter would have permitted elections in Najaf. But it is also possible he would not have permitted them. And he could have used his position in the Shrine as a sort of pulpit to spread his movement throughout the Shiite south. Of course, as a result of the violence, Najaf has now become largely depopulated, and its repopulation and significant participation is an open question.
   I realize there is a lot of speculation and guess-work in the above. As I said, it is hard to get a lot of reliable information about conditions in Iraq, and behind-the-scenes Iraqi politics. I might be dead wrong. But I am inclined to believe it is a mistake to think that the main barrier now to legitimate and credible elections is overly-aggressive US military tactics.

2. “The problem is that, whether under US assault or not, there are just too many violent factions in these cities who are fundamentally opposed to the whole US-designed and UN-backed transitional process, including the elections. They have no intention whatsoever of participating in these elections, and they are determined to bring it about that no one else participates either…”
   excellent observation imo…Professor Cole and others take comfort – satisfaction? – in the rising violence level…Cole frequently begins his daily blog with the “official” media reports of car bombings, assasinations, kidnappings, beheadings, etc, in the last 24 hours…and then almost gleefully reveals that his sources reveal that it was EVEN WORSE…and then he shares his info with his readers.
   yes, the elections in January – and the ones in Afghanistan in two weeks – will be marred by violence…but the real test will be whether ordinary Afghans and Iraqis in meaningful numbers risk their lives by passing through mean streets to reach schools, village halls and other polling places and cast their votes for a turn to sanity, decency and a future for their children.

3. Hello wesley,
   where is a logical connection between “sanity, decency and a future for their children” and the “elections”?

4. Shoot the messenger, eh, Wesley?
   Cole has predicted the consequences of various US govt mistakes on a regular basis, and warned against various destabilizing policies before they were put into action. He’s not to blame for being right. Nor for the fact that the US has almost run out of options.

5. Wesley,
   I think Cole is absolutely right to point out the depth of the mess in Iraq. The fact that the war has unleashed all of these violent forces from the Pandora’s box that was Iraq under Saddam is one reason, among many, that the war was so stupid to begin with. Now we have to figure out the best way of picking up the pieces, and try to get those people a decent government. But we don’t have to like it, or celebrate the effort like it is some great heroic triumph.
   Even if Iraq ends up with a decent, reasonably democratic government, it won’t follow that the war was a good idea. That would be just as illogical as someone ten years from now saying “the al-Qaeda attack on the World Trade Center was actually a good idea, because we ended up with a much better building on the site.” That would be an obscene judgment, because it completely ignores all the murder and suffering and destruction that was produced to get the good building.
   To bring about these oh-so-wonderful changes in Iraq, Bush had to kill over a thousand American soldiers, and many tens of thousands of Iraqis, and wound and maim many tens of thousands more people on both sides. As far as I am concerned, the guys is a thoughtless, stupid butcher and war criminal. He ought to be dragged before some court somewhere like Milosovic.
   I suspect that even if we get a decent government in Iraq, we are going to be left with an unruly, al-Qaeda-like, militantly Islamic quasi-state in Anbar province. The war has also given a huge dose of steroids to the militant, terrorist stream of the Islamic movement in the Middle East. And that doesn’t even begin to deal with the hash Bush has made out of the international system and the US relationship with the rest of the world.
   So when I argue with my progressive friends and say we should probably stay in Iraq longer, to help make the best out of a bad situation, rather than pull out immediately, don’t misread me as arguing that what is going on in Iraq now is some sort of inspiring march toward democracy. It’s a grotesque human catastrophe, and a permanent stain on our country’s honor. And it will always be a stain, even if we manage to put Iraq back together again.

6. if ordinary Afghans and Iraqis stream out of their homes at great risk to exercise their vote in the days and months ahead it will speak to me not as an endorsement of the Coalition exercise in regime change…which I was not defending…but as testament that the human spirit is not easily cowed even by suicide bombings, assasinations, kidnappings, beheadings and other unspeakable acts of violence cynically visited upon these people and, pathetically, celebrated in certain Western quarters.

7. Thanks for those two very thoughtful and discerning posts, Dan Kervick. The flaw that I think I see in your reasoning is that it doesn’t account for how US security measures are viewed by Iraqis. Personally I think that if the US adds more troops and “tightens security” it will increase the resistance.
   I think that many Iraqis would be happy if US troops actually made Iraq safer to provide an environment for elections, followed by a US withdrawal. The problem is that the US is not able to do that, for two reasons.
   First, we are at this moment supremely unqualified to create positive changes in an Arab/Muslim country. The US from our top leaders down is permeated with ignorance and hostility towards Iraqi culture. This is reflected in much that we have done in Iraq since our arrival.
   Second, we don’t intend to leave. I don’t think that the Iraqi people will stand for large permanent US bases on their territory.
   . . .suicide bombings, assasinations, kidnappings, beheadings and other unspeakable acts of violence cynically visited upon these people and, pathetically, celebrated in certain Western quarters.
   Not. Please provide one example of these actions being “celebrated” in “certain Western quarters”. Mentioning something is hardly the same as celebrating it. Or would you rather these things not be mentioned?

8. Dan: The last really good piece of reporting on Fallujah, for example, was Nir Rosen’s outstanding seven-part series in the Asia Times back in July.
   There have been some more recent reports on Falluja.

9. “celebrated”
   — no, not as in Dancing In the Streets but as in Gleefully Taking Satisfaction With…for example, one could go to Professor Cole’s blog almost any day and his lead story is apt to be the reported “insurgent” acts of mayhem (mostly directed against Iraqis) of the past 24 hours…followed by additional such acts missed by the mass media but revealed by his own sources…all related in a telltale “I told you so” tone of pleased vindication.
   now I have nothing against Cole…on the contrary he has considerable knowledge of the multifaceted mosaic that forms present day Iraq…but, at least to me, he wears his heart on his sleeve and scoring points against the Bush Administration ALWAYS trumps the welfare of ordinary Iraqis.

10. I appreciate the thoughtful opinions expressed here. It would seem to me that the elections have already failed. No legitimacy is going to come from going forward with them. If they carry them out they will only exacerbate the situation further. We have reports that the expat parties now running the government are planning to run a unity ticket that will effectively freeze out independents. They are supposed to be already divvying up the seats in parliament amongst themselves. If that is the case then what’s the point. It ony turns the Iraqi people into cannon fodder as they line up at polling places. It’s much simpler to just let the IG appoint a parliament and save some needless trauma.
    IMO the only positive way forward is to hand the whole process over to Sistani and the AMS. Let them work out a compromise national salvation government that would appeal to the moderate middle. We need to strengthen that group rather than continue to rely on what amount to carpetbaggers. If the U.S. were to back off and let such a government assert some real independence there might be a chance of saving Iraq. If such a government could be formed, it would actually be better to have a constitutional convention before an election. That way an inclusive framework could be worked out between all the interest groups before polling took place. A big stumbling block here is that the U.S. would have to give up all it’s strategic goals in Iraq. I certainly don’t have a problem with that, but some folks in the Pentagon and the State Dept. would. This idea may sound far fetched, but does anyone have a better one?

11. Haydar,
    I doubt the Kurds would accept a government of the kind you suggest. Wouldn’t there would have to be a (nationalistic) Kurdish component as well?
    The main problem, as I see it, with your proposal is that anyone to whom the US “hands off” a government is automatically tainted and suspect by virtue of the fact that it is the US doing the handing off. That’s Allawi’s main problem – he’s Iraq’s Petain. the best way for Sistani to destroy his prestige would be to start working with the US to engineer an unelected government with him at the top.
    So far as I can tell, the majority of the people in Iraq still *want* the elections to take place. The election does have a UN resolution backing up its legitimacy, and a UN electoral assistance commission arranging its logistics. Certainly the legitimacy of the election will be compromised to the extent there is less than full participation. And people will be frustrated by the major party coalition you mentioned, which will probably be able to get the lion’s share of seats in the Assembly. But another US-appointed government will probably have even less legitimacy.
    If some parts of the Sunni heartland are excluded, the Shia and Kurds will be very happy to get the state all for themselves, with an even larger commanding role in the governement (although the state might not last very long). Perhaps they can figure out what to do with the renegade Sunni areas afterward. But it might also be the case that if the Sunnis see that the elections are going to take place, with or without their participation, most of their leaders will decide to participate in the end rather than be locked out of significant representation in the government, and a role in writing the constitution. Perhaps the Sunni insurgency will die down once the US withdraws (if that ever happens) and a new government is in control. Also, almost all of the oil is in the north and south, so a government dominated by the Kurds and Shiites will hold most of the cards. Wishful thinking, I know, but I don’t see any better options.
    I also don’t believe Sistani either wants to rule, or is equipped to take over a government. He is said to represent a “quietist” brand of Shia Islam, that sees the appropriate role of the clergy as an offstage power, exercising moral suasion by speaking out publicly, but not having any formal involvement in government.
    I love the irony of your proposal though. Imagine some Iraqi paper currency 30 or 40 years from now, with a big picture of Bush on the front, surrounded by a “God is Great” inscription, and a caption beneath his picture that says “George Bush, Father of the Islamic Republic of Iraq.”

12. Helena
    after reading the preceding comments, imo it is a tribute to your blogger site that serious alternatives for charting Iraq’s FUTURE are being put forward and discussed…the usual discourse found elsewhere rarely goes beyond who is to blame for the PRESENT situation.

13. Thanks for the feedback. As I mentioned, the biggest problem with my idea is that the U.S. would have to take their hands off the process completely in order not to taint it. They would have to ask the UN to send a delegation to Sistani and Harith al-Dhari of the AMS. If they agreed to work together, they would not install themselves in power, but would choose a technocrat government. The Kurds would have to be worked in as well. The incentive for them would be a coming constitutional conference that would guarantee their rights. This would all have to be sheparded by the UN, and the U.S. Military could also helpfully stop all offensive engagements. The moderate religious authorities still have legitimacy in Iraq, and a government with the specific endorsement of Sistani will automatically have the backing of up to 65% of the population. It is noted that Sistani has not endorsed the current IG, and looks likely to withhold his endorsement of a government that results from rigged elections. If Harith al-Dhari can bring along some of the more moderate Sunni resistance factions into this coalition, the moderate middle will have a government that they would be willing to fight for. I’m not saying it won’t be bloody, as there is not going to be any negotiation with the Zarqawi types. They will have to be eradicated. But they are only flourishing in a vacuum of legitimacy. An Iraqi government filled with expat carpetbaggers and simply fronting for the U.S. has not worked. They are really just another militia, albeit with the U.S. Military backing them. In fact, they are a group of private militias. Outside of Sistani and Harith al-Dhari of the AMS I don’t see anyone else to turn to. I believe they hold the key to keeping Iraq together in some semblance of a nation state. But could you imagine Bush or Kerry signing on to this plan?

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