Najaf: US command chain broken

Yesterday evening I started to tease apart some of the political stuff that’s been happening in Iraq, over the now-linked issues of Moqtada’s stand-off in Najaf and the National Conference going ahead in Baghdad. Overnight, I started wondering about the decisionmaking on the US-forces side.
Who on the US side had made the decision to start and then maintain the confrontation against Moqtada? I wondered. The answers that are now starting to become available make depressing reading, and portray a command system for the US forces in Iraq that looks seriously broken.
These answers–which are still not totally complete–come in an informative piece in the NYT by Alex Berenson and John F. Burns. Datelined from Najaf, and citing officers in the local commands of the Marines and US Army right there in the city, the two men write:

    Acting without the approval of the Pentagon or senior Iraqi officials, the Marine officers said in recent interviews, they turned a firefight with Mr. Sadr’s forces on Thursday, Aug. 5, into a eight-day pitched battle…

They continue by noting that:

    Fighting here continues, and what the Marines had hoped would be a quick, decisive action has bogged down into a grinding battle that appears to have strengthened the hand of Mr. Sadr, whose stature rises each time he survives a confrontation with the American military. It may have weakened the credibility of the interim Iraqi government of Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, showing him, many Iraqis say, to be alternately rash and indecisive, as well as ultimately beholden to American overrule on crucial military and political matters.

Actually, I would describe the negative political consequences of that unbelievably rash decision by the local Marines commanders in much stronger terms than Berenson and Burns do.
Compared with the situation back on August 1, before the present round of escalation in Najaf, I think (for the reasons I indicated yesterday, and earlier) it is indubitably the case that Moqtada has become politically stronger inside Iraq, and Allawi weaker.
In addition, the all-important plan to rebuild a viable Iraqi security force has been set back considerably once again. And once again, as in the April round of escalations, the decomposing of a large chunk of the Iraqi security force has been caused by the US Marines going all gung-ho into a quite unnecessary local military confrontation and then–since they require a local Iraqi-force “cover–forcing the still-fragile Iraqi forces to join them and thus forcing the Iraqi forces into an unnecessary and politically challenging battle long before they are militarily or politically ready for any such test.
Is it any wonder that the fledgling Iraqi forces fell apart once again, when faced with such a test? Do the Marines have no learning curve at all, I wonder?
In both cases–April, Fallujah, and August, Najaf–these confrontations came almost immediately after the Marines, deploying to replace US Army units, decided unilaterally to change the “rules of engagement” under which the Army had operated, which in both cases had previously kept the Army units out of the known geographic areas where their presence would be seen as immediately provocative.
So here’s my second question: Why on earth would decisions like changing the existing rules of engagement be left to the local officers, rather than requiring authorization from higher up the chain of command?
The concept of “fire control” is a crucial one in the conduct of any military operations. At the small-unit level, it has to do with using resources efficiantly in order to achieve the objectives. At a larger-unit level it becomes more strategic and political, as well.
Did those escalatory, gung-ho decisions made by the local Marines officers serve or dis-serve the broad strategic objectives of the US in Iraq?


Personally, I would say they did a strong disservice to the US’s broad interests. Okay, I know my definition of the US’s broad interests is very different from that of most people now running the US occupation in Iraq. (Or, “presence”, however they like to define it.) But I think they would probably agree with me on a couple of minimal points, like:

    (1) It is in the interests of the US (and also, I would argue, the Iraqis) that the plan to prepare elections go ahead as smoothly, successfully, fairly, and legitimately as possible, and
    (2) It is in the interests of the US (and also, I would add, the Iraqis) that the reconstitution of an efficient, democratically accountable internal security force go ahead as successfully, legitimatly, and rapidly as possible. (Partly in order to help enable (1) above.)

If we can indeed agree on those objectives, then Col. Anthony M. Haslam, the commander of the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, which replaced two army dvisions in and around Najaf on July 31, should be held to strict disciplinary account for the disastrously esclatory decisions he made in the days following that takeover.
The Berenson/Burns piece comes equipped with a somewhat though not completely helpful timeline of events, as well as some solid reporting (from the US side). They write:

    Senior officers in Baghdad, as well [as] White House officials who discussed the battle in Washington, say the latest fighting began when a Marine patrol drove directly past one of Mr. Sadr’s houses in Najaf – violating an informal agreement that American units would stay away from Mr. Sadr’s strongholds…

That drive-by happened August 3– just three days after the Marines took over. (The way the reporters write this makes clear that “Senior officers in Baghdad, as well as White House officials” have at least been working a little bit at trying to understand how this whole confrontation developed. Which I guess is a minimally encouraging sign.)
Then on Aug.5, the Sadrists responded by staging a night-time attack on an Iraqi police station. The police shot back and reinforcement from the US Marines were called in to help them. Called in by whom, you ask? According to B&B, they were called in by the local Iraqi governor, Adnan al-Zurfi, an Allawi appointee.
Elsewhere in the piece, however, they write:

    The governor, Adnan al-Zurfi, an Allawi appointee, refuses to confirm having given the green light, although American commanders in Baghdad cited his commands repeatedly as the political cover for the Marine attack.

Oh, do I detect the lovely scent of rear ends being massively covered all round there?
So then, according to B&B, after the Marines deployed to help “save” the police station August 5…

    American intelligence officials monitoring Mr. Sadr said he then summoned reinforcements from around the country, and Ambassador John D. Negroponte, the top American official in Iraq, “decided to pursue the case,” one official said. One result was a domino effect, with the fighting in Najaf soon replicated in more than half a dozen cities and towns across southern Iraq that are Mahdi Army strongholds, including the Baghdad slum of Sadr City, Diwaniya, Kut, Al Hayy, Nasiriya, Amara and Basra.

So Negroponte now enters the chain of command– or at least, this is the case according to one un-named, unidentified “official”…
How does that work, I wonder? I mean, I know the military all has its own chain of command that runs up to the top military officer in the country… But then, I thought it still ran back through the Joint Chiefs to the DOD. But no. If this account is true, the local US Ambassador is significantly in the chain of command there somehow.
One wonders how Negroponte ran things, command-wise, back when he was “Ambassador” in Honduras and was also, in that position, majorly in charge of running the anti-Sandinista contra forces in against Nicaragua. Maybe he’s trying to use that same model now. Except that 135,000 heavily armed US forces are quite a bit more important and much more logistically complex to order around than a couple of thousand of lightly armed (and let’s face it, fairly expendable from the US point of view) ‘contra’ guerrillas.
There is some evidence in the B&B story, meanwhile, that Haslam and his second-in-command, understood that what they were doing by escalating the situation in Najaf was politically very sensitive and that they might be skirting or even openly flouting the military’s established operating procedures. Here’s what they write:

    Marine commanders in Najaf acknowledge that they did little planning for the battle, but say they gambled that they could reach the walls of the Old City so fast that they would outrun the political firestorm sure to result.
    “We just did it,” said Maj. David Holahan, second in command of the Marine unit in Najaf.

I could parse that latter utterance a little bit more. Does it sound like Unca Dick Cheney saying he used the F-word “just because it felt good”? Certainly, it strongly conveys a determination to try to “sneak in a quick one”, just because Haslam and Holahan though they could get away with it. And how about “gambled”, too?
Later, B&B recall claims by Marine officers that they’d killed “hundreds” of Sadrist fighters and quote the uncouth Holahan as telling them, “We put a major hurt on his hard-core militia members. Things happened pretty well from a military point of view.” (They also note that Sadr’s spokesmen have disputed the American figures for their dead, saying fewer than 30 were killed in those early encounters.)
Uncouth? How about “insensitive”, while we’re about it. I think people–like John Kerry, among others–who call for US security operations to be “sensitive” are not calling for officers like Maj. Holahan to be sent to charm school. They’re calling on the military to start to operate on the basis of some rudimentary understanding of the political conseuqences of what they do.
It also seems very clear to me that the evident dysfunctionalities in the US forces’ chain of command in Iraq need to be corrected, immediately. How on earth can a couple of low-level reprobates like Haslam and Holahan be allowed to get away with making on-the-fly decisions for escalation, regardless of the broader consequences? They should be visibly disciplined, and the whole command situation brought back under some form of rational control.
As of now, it seems that a degree of Army presence has been restored in Najaf. As B&B write:

    By early evening on Aug. 5, the [Marines] battalion had sent out an urgent request for reinforcements. Senior commanders sent the First Battalion of the Fifth Cavalry Regiment, a heavy Army unit, from Baghdad.
    Maj. Gen. Peter Chiarelli, the First Cavalry Division commander overseeing American troops in Baghdad, said … that the division did not know until the last minute that the 1,800 marines in Najaf might need reinforcements. The Fifth Cavalry Regiment’s tanks and other armored vehicles were patrolling in Baghdad when the request for help arrived, he said. By then, American troops in the capital were under intense pressure themselves, fighting Sadr militiamen in Sadr City and in skirmishes in other Shiite districts.
    Army units began to prepare to move immediately, but the 120-mile drive from Baghdad, through some of the most rebel-infested territory in Iraq, took two days, Colonel Miyamasu said, with the forces arriving in Najaf on Saturday. By then, many marines had been fighting for almost 48 hours straight, in temperatures that topped 120 degrees each day…

The presence of the Army forces may have stabilized the military situation and restored some integrity to the fire-control situation there. However, the plans for a further US-Allawist escalation in Najaf appear not yet to have been shelved. The latest news I have–Reuters’ Khaled Farhan out of Najaf, 9:11 a.m., EST– says:

    Iraq’s defense minister gave Shi’ite militiamen in the holy city of Najaf hours to surrender Wednesday, warning that troops were preparing for a major assault to “teach them a lesson they will never forget.”

Okay, so now it’s “Iraq’s defense minister”–a fairly belligerent guy– who is allegedly calling the shots. Based on eveything we know about the relationship between the Allawist “government” and the US occupiers, I don’t believe that for a moment.
But if it’s not the defense minister, but rather, someone on the US side who’s really giving the orders… then actually, who is it?
Is it Negroponte? Is it Rumsfeld? Is it Colin Powell? Or is it Col. Haslam and Maj. Holahan? So far, the chain of command looks like a truly tangled and counter-productive mess.

30 thoughts on “Najaf: US command chain broken”

  1. i was directed to your site by juancole today.
    juan sites The War in Context article by Paul Woodward. Woodward makes clear the position of Muqtada. muqtada “is thus far the only political leader who is untainted.” — the antithesis of all the iraqi collaborateurs aligned with the occupation, e.g. najaf regional “governor” Ali al-Zurfi, who undoubtedly has a price on his head.
    muqtada wears his cloth. he seems incorruptible, disdaining american power and money. he is a nationalist cleric. it must be hard for a man of the cloth to turn to militant resistance, but his role against the occupation is not of his making.
    very significant is muqtada’s recent declaration as reported in the wash. post: “The occupation has to go out of Iraq,” Sadr said on al-Jazeera, the Arabic satellite television network. “Iraq is ours. The wealth is ours. The land is ours. The Iraqis can govern Iraq. There will be no civil war, as the U.S. says.”
    his statement is short, simple, practical, and to the main points, and it includes a promise.
    http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=1802&ncid=1802&e=2&u=/washpost/20040815/ts_washpost/a105_2004aug14
    thanks for your thoughtful posts.
    ross

  2. I do not believe that B&B of NYT know what happened in Najaf, and neither do the “uncouth” Marines that you quote. The whole thing was a set-up, planned in advance by the US
    embassy, Alawi’s provisional “government,” and the US stooge governor of Najaf, Adnan al Zurufi, who until recently unemployed in Michigan. Al-Sadr was deliberately provoked by an attempted raid on his hideout that violated the earlier truce. When he responded, the Americans clobbered him. The Marines are the fall guys, the dupes, and since B&B talked only to them they of course got & printed the wrong story.
    I’m just a dumb Amcit who smells a rat. I wish you or someone could sniff out the truth, but I have little hope.

  3. I do not believe that B&B of NYT know what happened in Najaf, and neither do the “uncouth” Marines that you quote. The whole thing was a set-up, planned in advance by the US
    embassy, Alawi’s provisional “government,” and the US stooge governor of Najaf, Adnan al Zurufi, who until recently unemployed in Michigan. Al-Sadr was deliberately provoked by an attempted raid on his hideout that violated the earlier truce. When he responded, the Americans clobbered him. The Marines are the fall guys, the dupes, and since B&B talked only to them they of course got & printed the wrong story.
    I’m just a dumb Amcit who, like al-Sistani of the timely trip to London, smells a rat. I wish you or someone could sniff out the truth, but I have little hope.

  4. One might note that both “Manchurian Incident” of 1931 and “China Incident” of 1937 were allegedly perpetrated by local Japanese forces without approval of Tokyo. There has been much debate as to how true these claims are–historians generally seem to agree that they are true, but tell average Chinese that Japanese aggression in 1930’s were perpetrated without a high-level conspiracy in Tokyo. Whether Marines acted with or without Washington’s approval may not be the important point to the Iraqis and, possibly, to the world at large.

  6. Hey, I’m new here, but it looks like I’d wanna become a regular. Your piece was very enlightning, thanks a lot.
    Can I bring up a stupid point? What’s with the underlined text? I keep thinking it’s a link, but it turns out to be an emphasis. What about using bold for that and keep the underlining for links so a simple country-boy such as myself don’t get confused.

  7. My son is one of those “uncouth Marines” that you disparage. It’s a damned good thing for you that he does not get to pick and choose who he protects and defends. If the Army had done their job, the Marines wouldn’t have to clean up after them. The boots on the ground have a perspective that academics, and those who sit far removed from the battlefield, will never have. My reaction to the Marine move is “well done”. Now, I hope they can finish the job and remove Sadr permanently.

  8. “(1) It is in the interests of the US (and also, I would argue, the Iraqis) that the plan to prepare elections go ahead as smoothly, successfully, fairly, and legitimately as possible, and
    (2) It is in the interests of the US (and also, I would add, the Iraqis) that the reconstitution of an efficient, democratically accountable internal security force go ahead as successfully, legitimatly, and rapidly as possible. (Partly in order to help enable (1) above.)”
    Pardon my cynicism but I think there are are some in the Bush regime who would like to determine the outcome of the elections by eliminating the opposition or whatever it takes. Failing that, they would sabotage the process and keep their appointee in power.

  9. “My reaction to the Marine move is “well done”. Now, I hope they can finish the job and remove Sadr permanently.”
    Yes, indeedy! They have to finish the job of liberating Iraq – from Iraqis.
    Your son and all his comrades should be shipped home where they belong – now.

  10. Deb,
    With all due respect to your son, who is I am sure at his core a decent person, and to you and your feelings for your son and your apparent desperate need to believe in what he is doing no matter what: Have you ever stopped to think about how Iraqis – the ordinary, everyday ones who suffer daily both directly and indirectly at the hands of your son and his comrades – experience the Marines? If you did, you would find that uncouth is the kindest thing you would hear from them.
    This is not a slap at your son, who is in a very real way also a victim of this debacle.

  11. Thank you for your analysis. I too am very dismayed that such a foolish and deadly undertaking like provoking Moqtada Al-Sadr into another confrontation can be ordered by officers in the field. I suspect as you imply that as in the Abu Gharib situation a “shadow” command structure gave tacit approval. Nonetheless, my relatives in Iraq certainly beleive that the US has a racist (anti-Shia) vendetta against Sayyid Moqtada Al-Sadr that started with the trumped up murder charges against him after the closing of his newspaper. There seems to be a concerted effort to remove him from the scene, perhaps to prevent the Iraqi people from voting for a theocracy or perhaps a government that would call for the elimination of US troops. What they fail to understand is that killing Moqtada no more removes him from the scene than killing Imam Ali removed him. The Al-Sadr family is among the most respected (even revered in cases) in Iraq going back literally 1,000 years. As unlikely a revoloutionary leader as this young man is, the movement he has inspired will eventually be lead by another Al-Sadr and will eventually prevail because the Iraqis simply care more about who rules Iraq than the the American public does.

  12. Keith,
    It is also in the interest of a robber/mass rapist/mass murderer that he get rewarded for his crimes by being allowed to go free and keep everything he stole. It is even better for him if he can look like he actually benefitted his victims.
    What is in the interest of Iraqis is for the U.S. to get out of Iraq now, and leave it to Iraqis to work out their destiny, for better or for worse.

  13. There are probably different goals among the US authorities, be they civilian or military. I think that US wants to control Iraq and ME because they are strategically important given their rich oil reserves and the huge US consumption of energy. So IMO, despite all the talk of bringing democracy to Iraq, the US whether army or marines, aren’t ready to leave Iraq as long as they aren’t sure they will get a friendly Iraqi government, one which would welcome permanent US bases in Iraq.
    In this context, the US interest (at least that of the Bushies) isn’t to get democratic elections now (they would clearly give way to a Shiites religious government). US interest instead is to maintain a continual low level insurgency, one which would justify the continual presence of US troops and the impossibility to held democratic elections.
    What we are seeing now is US installing a new kind of colonial power in ME.
    I think that if the Marines attacked, they knew perfectly what they were doing. They surely had green light from the Pentagon, if not directly from the ME commander.

  14. Ahlan Najmidean – nice to see you here. I was so glad to see your excellent comments.
    Based on the information I have garnered about what happened in the Abu Ghraib prison (by the way, the place is indeed kullish gharib, but that is not its name. 🙂 ) was condoned, approved and possibly even ordered from much, much higher up than a mere “shadow” command structure, and the approval was more than tacit. Those types of abuses were very widespread and not limited to Abu Ghraib, and they are in nature if not in every specific detail typical of the types of abuses Israel uses on a routine basis. There is much more I can tell about this, but it’s late, and it is really not on topic for this discussion.
    Sure, the U.S. occupiers are desperate to remove Sayyid Muqtada from the scene because they see him as a threat to their agenda. I believe what Bremer did in the Spring – closing down his practically unknown little newspaper (which had a gigantic circulation of all of 10,000, and contained nothing that could reasonably be called incitement), deciding suddenly to execute an arrest warrant that had supposedly been gathering dust for six months, and the multiple daily announcements by the Americans that their new mission was to capture or kill him – was a deliberate provocation. So was the recent military attack on his militia, which had been quiescent since the so-called “spring uprising”. In both cases they were trying to create an excuse to take him out.
    Of course, as they always do in Iraq, they accomplish the exact opposite of what they intended. Every move they make against him only serves to increase his stature. What the Americans, in their apparently incurable ignorace, cannot grasp is that even those who do not like Muqtada will not accept their actions. They may never exactly support Muqtada, but they will turn completely against the Americans for their unnecessary brutality against Iraqis, Iraqi cities, and especially Iraqi historic and holy places.
    You are absolutely right when you say that killing Muqtada will do the exact opposite of removing him from the scene. It will make him into a legend that will last for centuries. Every move the Americans make against him makes him more important. What about that is difficult to understand? This is not some strange exotic Iraqi phenomenon, it is human nature at work.

  15. Christiane,
    Iraqis have lived under colonial rule for centuries. They know what it looks like. If it walks like colonial rule, quacks like colonial rule, and looks like colonial rule – guess what?
    And the parallels between what is happening now and the early days of the British colonial effort of the early 20th century are and have been from the beginning, stunning.

  16. To say/think “Of course, as they always do in Iraq, they accomplish the exact opposite of what they intended,” is to assume we know what ‘they’ intended… and that ‘they’ operate from clearly formulated intentions, which we can discern.

  17. Excellent point in general Adela. However, I think it is quite safe to say that they were not hoping to turn Muqtada Al Sadr into a major hero – let alone an historical figure.

  18. Of course, I agree ‘they’ probably had no intention of hero-izing al Sadr.
    What I was getting at was the ‘probably’.
    What I forgot to include was stating our implicit points of view in each of our comments… our individual answer to whether we’ve judged the ‘they’ to be a knave or a fool… a manipulator or a manipulator.
    I ‘see’ bushandco’s entire iraqi adventuring as 1. a tactic for diverting attention from their ‘larger’ purpose[managing the “homeland” as they wish]; 2. perpetuating their reign; 3; enriching their, and their cohorts, coffers.
    Given that, there’s no benefit to them in “iraq” becoming a viable, functioning entity.

  19. I read that piece in the Times on Thursday. And I did not believe for one instant that the officers on the ground made the decisions, in spite of the reporting to the contrary.
    Deniability. We saw it in the torture memos. We see it in the “Swift Boat” lies. We see it in the Marines’ ability to rush into battle and protect those above them from taking responsiblity.
    In an election year there is little that happens unless it has been run by Karl Rove. Yes, they have a poor track record of decision-making and understanding people from other countries. But there is no way these Marines just went in there on their own after changing the rules of engagement on their own.
    Latest lie. Latest cover for the prez. Totally in line with the bully presidency.

  20. I read that piece in the Times on Thursday. And I did not believe for one instant that the officers on the ground made the decisions, in spite of the reporting to the contrary.
    Deniability. We saw it in the torture memos. We see it in the “Swift Boat” lies. We see it in the Marines’ ability to rush into battle and protect those above them from taking responsiblity.
    In an election year there is little that happens unless it has been run by Karl Rove. Yes, they have a poor track record of decision-making and understanding people from other countries. But there is no way these Marines just went in there on their own after changing the rules of engagement on their own.
    Latest lie. Latest cover for the prez. Totally in line with the bully presidency.

  21. I’m amazed that more hasn’t been made of this story.
    There was much criticism during the Vietnam war that bombing targets in North Vietnam were being approved or rejected at the level of the President and Defence Secretary. Perhaps so, but under the ideology of American politicians of the time, the nature and level of bombing of North Vietnam was supposed to be sending very important signals to the North Vietnamese to help bring about a just and early end to the war. And since these signals were thought by American politicians to be crucial to ending the war, the politicians kept careful rein over the actions of the military.
    Turn now to August, 2004. The two biggest political and military problems in Iraq are the Sunni triangle and Sadr.
    Bush et al might decide that for political reasons now is the time to get Sadr militarily. The Iraqi government, at the highest level, might decide that for political reasons now is the time to get Sadr militarily. That might be the right decision, that might be the wrong decision. But it is a decision with important military,
    political and even electoral effects.
    As I understand it, the Bush administration did not decide in early August that they wanted to change the status quo in Najaf. They may not have liked the situation there, but they didn’t decide to go after Sadr militarily.
    If this is true, how and why did US Marines go after Sadr?
    Any government with leaders with body temperatures above room temperature would lay out specific instructions over and keep careful watch over the situation in Najaf. Unbelievable as it sounds they might have a political or diplomatic official on the ground at Najaf.
    Especially if there is a change of command from the Army to Marines and the Marines a few months earlier when taking over from the Army in Fallujah may have contributed to the mess there.
    But either the Marines were given instructions on the sensitivity of Najaf and ignored getting political approval or the Bushies weren’t keeping careful watch over Najaf and making sure the US military was acting in accordance with the US political aims and policies.
    If the Marines ignored their orders they should be held accountable. And in either case, the Bush Administration and Rumsfield in particular should be held politically accountable for not ensuring proper control over the actions of the US military in Najaf.
    This is truly amazing. The actions of the Marines to go after Sadr in Najaf show that the Bush administration doesn’t learn well. They don’t pay attention to the details. They’re not in control of their own troops.
    The mission was accomplished when the
    President said so, so nobody paid a lot of attention to what came next. Now, over a year later, the Bush administration still hasn’t figured out that the details matter and that planning matters.

  22. Adela,
    What you are viewing as the purposes driving the Bush regime’s adventure in Iraq are merely side benefits. What is behind the invasion and attempted takeover of Iraq is much bigger, much more far reaching, much more important and much, much more sinister than the three points you listed.

  23. Well, shit, Shirin, what is behind the invasion that is big, important, and much, much more sinister?
    Elucidate, please.

  24. Dick,
    If you wish me to take your comments and/or questions seriously you might start by stating them in a serious, not to say civil, manner.
    Having said that, if you really wish to understand what was behind the attack on Iraq, I suggest you might start with the website for the Project for the New American Century. You will find some very familiar names among the membership of that group.

  25. Hi, friends! Thanks for all your comments. This looks like a great discussion. (But Dick, do know that I don’t intend to continue hosting comments with language that is offensive or demeaning to some other participants. Intercultural communication can be complex, but it’s a worthwhile goal, I reckon.)
    Sorry I’ve been a bit AWOL from the blog recently. I’ve been dealing with a couple of medical things in my family. Oh also, going great guns writing my book on Africa. Eight chapters done now!!!
    Deb, I was really glad you posted your comment and hope you’ll carry on coming back here from time to time. I do believe I was only referring to one or two particular Marines officers as “uncouth”. I certainly don’t want to tar everyone in the corps w/ the same brush. I wonder if you’ve ever read Marine’s Girl’s great blog? She sometimes puts in the texts of entire IM sessions w/ her guy, who’s in Iraq. They both seem like wonderful, very concerned and caring people.
    I can imagine it’s really, really tough for you having yr son over there, so I’m really, really wishing for his safety and that he gets back to you whole in body and spirit.
    As for the broader issue of what “they”–our vaunted leaders here in the US, that is– “want” in Iraq, that they’ve been so willing to throw Deb’s son and scores of thousands of other people’s sons (but not, curiously, their own?) into battle there to achieve it…. well, I’ll have to work on a big new post about that another time.

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