Thoughtful human-rights theorist Michael Ignatieff has a one-year-after piece in the NYT mag today. He starts off with an apparently frank and engaging admission:
- A year ago, I was a reluctant yet convinced supporter of the war in Iraq. A year later, the weapons of mass destruction haven’t turned up, Iraqis are being blown up on their way to the mosque, democracy is postponed till next year and my friends are all asking me if I have second thoughts. Who wouldn’t have?
Later, he writes that in the run-up to the war his view had been that,
- While I thought the case for preventive war was strong, it wasn’t decisive. It was still possible to argue that the threat was not imminent and that the risks of combat were too great. What tipped me in favor of taking these risks was the belief that Hussein ran an especially odious regime and that war offered the only real chance of overthrowing him. This was a somewhat opportunistic case for war, since I knew that the administration did not see freeing Iraq from tyranny as anything but a secondary objective…
I couldn’t see how I could will the end — Hussein must go — without willing the only available means: American invasion, if need be, alone…
So I supported an administration whose intentions I didn’t trust, believing that the consequences would repay the gamble.
But then, in his most serious (if still not totally explicit) admission of error yet, he writes,
- Now I realize that intentions do shape consequences…
… An administration that cared more genuinely about human rights would have understood that you can’t have human rights without order and that you can’t have order once victory is won if planning for an invasion is divorced from planning for an occupation. The administration failed to grasp that from the first moment an American tank column took a town, there had to be military police and civilian administrators following behind to guard museums, hospitals, water-pumping stations and electricity generators and to stop looting, revenge killings and crime. Securing order would have meant putting 250,000 troops into the invasion as opposed to 130,000. It would have meant immediately retaining and retraining the Iraqi Army and police, instead of disbanding them. The administration, which never tires of telling us that hope is not a plan, had only hope for a plan in Iraq.
Earlier in the piece, he had written, as a way to exculpate himself and those others like him who had been “liberal hawks” in the run-up to the war: “it turned out, nobody actually knew very much about Iraq.”
Nobody, Michael? What nonsense! Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki had known a lot about what it would take to run an effective occupation in Iraq, and about the quite foreseeable circumstances in which this would need to be done, when he testified on Capitol Hill many weeks before the war… There were people in the State Department’s Bureau of I&R who were willing to state in fall of 2002 that they judged that Saddam had destroyed all his WMDs long ago… And you live right there in Boston, I think. So you could easily have seen this column that I wrote in the CSM on January 9, 2003…
And that’s just for starters. Your claim that “nobody actually knew very much about Iraq” is quite unjustified. What you mean, perhaps, is that nobody you listened to closely turned out to have known much about Iraq, which is a different proposition completely.
Elsewhere in the piece, Ignatieff reveals that on the night the US bombing of Iraq began, he had been with an–unnamed– Iraqi exile. How nice for him. Many Iraqi exiles are, I know, decent, honorable people. But a good number of exiles did, nonetheless, form a very incestuous, unscrupulous, and insistent little coterie of war-mongers, so people who heard their point of view– as Ignatieff apparently did– would certainly have needed to make an effort to hear different points of view…
What most saddened me about this piece, however, was the extent to which it revealed that Ignatieff–whom I have generally thought of as a smart and decent internationalist– seemes to have bought the line that the US doesn’t really need the UN any more. At least, he gives no recognition that it might need it, and that a more robust American recognition of this fact might be the sole saving grace to be extracted from the whole sorry US-Iraq imbroglio.
For example, he mischaracterizes the French position, writing that the French “weren’t ready to authorize military options.” Well, as De Villepin said in February-March, they weren’t ready to authorize a military option right then– because they wanted to give the UN inspections more time. But they might well have done so later. Later–if it seemed clear that Iraq was not complying with UNMOVIC’s demands, which it never was up till March 19, 2003– even Russia and China might have been prepared to support an attack, as well as France.
And then, at the very end, Ignatieff seems to be telling us that it is only the continued presence of US forces in Iraq that can stand between the Iraqi people and total chaos:
- Whether freedom turns into long-term constitutional order depends on whether a vicious resistance that does not hesitate to pit Muslim against Muslim, Iraqi against Iraqi, can drive an administration, fearful about its re-election, into drawing down U.S. forces. If the United States falters now, civil war is entirely possible. If it falters, it will betray everyone who has died for something better.
It’s not entirely clear to me what the mock-heroic exhortation that the US not “falter” actually means. It’s entirely possible that to Michael Ignatieff, any US move to share power and responsibility with the UN might constitute such faltering?
If he wants to save anything of his credentials as an internationalist, and not just the “liberal imperialist” that he seems to be from many parts of this text, Ignatieff should spell out clearly that the US cannot and should not continue to rule Iraq alone; the UN must be brought in.
Equally, the US must itself be brought much more firmly back into accepting the responsibilities and upholding the rules of the UN.
Ignatieff, however, says neither of these things. In my view he has a lot more thinking to do than he shows evidence of here–about what the whole Iraq affair reveals about the US, and what this whole sorry record means for the future of Iraq, the US, and the world.
Helena,
You make a point about how it was perfectly possible to get decent information about Iraq prior to the war. Someone I know spent a great deal of time leading up to the war reading as much news coverage as she could, and blessed only with decent critical analysis skills, came up with the following predictions in late February:
She wrote then:
1. We will, without question, go to war with Iraq, and do so in the first half of this year, likely in March — regardless of what happens with the UN check
2. The war will be short — no more than a month or so. check
3. There will be a high number of civilian casualties due to urban fighting in Baghdad and the “shock and awe” bombing tactics being discussed currently — but we may not actually find out what the casualty estimates are right away (as in Afghanistan) because of lock downs on the news media. By “high”, I mean 10,000 or more deaths, not including the humanitarian toll afterwards. Given that there were roughly 3000 deaths in Afghanistan, this seems about right as a minimum number. check
4. There will be little or no chemical weapons used, and no biological weapons used in the fighting check
5. Iraq may fire a few SCUDS at Israel, but, like the last war, nothing will come of it. (I have no idea if Israel will join if provoked; I suspect it depends on how many SCUDS get over there) no SCUDS; nothing came of it
6. Turkey will introduce troops in the north to control the Kurds. This will turn into a wildcard after the war is over, and complicate the efforts to stabilize the country in the aftermath. There may even be violence between the Kurds and the Turks. (Question: which side do we support then? Both are supposed to be allies. I suspect that we end up siding with the Turks.) dead wrong
7. We will, as has been repeated very often recently, see a U.S. takeover of the Iraqi government for a duration of at least one year, possibly longer. check
8. We will find no significant amounts of usable WMD; we will NOT see significant news coverage of what actual WMD are discovered, and the issue will fade away over time basically true
9. Refugees will mass on the various borders, particularly Iran, but Iran won’t let many in, and there will be a significant humanitarian problem on that border in particular dead wrong
10. The Shi’ite Iraqi opposition will be very upset at the U.S. takeover of the government, and agitate against it — perhaps resorting to violence — terrorist or low-grade military engagements should have said Sunni, not Shi’ite
11. We will see an increase in terrorist activity — perhaps not during the war, but after, and it may increase over time as the US retains a presence in Iraq. This terrorist activity will be primarily directed towards Americans in Iraq, secondarily in neighboring countries, and we may see some in the States. basically true, although Spain has borne the worst brunt of this
12. We will not be able to establish a functioning democracy in Iraq, and will leave without doing so, perhaps even after installing a puppet. (This may be debatable in the future; I would argue that there is no functioning democracy right now in Afghanistan, but some would disagree with me.) TBD
13. The neo-conservative theory about democracy spreading in the Middle East because of our intervention will be proven incorrect TBD
14. The American recession will continue, and probably worsen over the next couple of years, exacerbated by the non-productive deficit caused by the war ok, so it’s not really a recession — just stagnation
Vivion – In response to your laundry list:
1 – The US would not have attacked in March if the UN had resolved to attack earlier. Given that the US (and most of the rest of the world) genuinely believed Iraq to hold WMDs, not surprisingly they put their own self-interests ahead of the UN’s. Once a nuke goes off in downtown Chicago, it is too late to say, ‘oops, maybe they did have WMDs after all’.
2 – This is an interesting prediction, given the number of ‘quagmire’/’Vietnam’ predictions from the anti-war crowd.
3 – The number of civilian casualties was very low for a war of regime change, such as this one.
4 – Another interesting prediction, although there is evidence to the effect that such attacks were ordered. Obviously, your oracle friend knew something that Saddam didn’t.
5 – Good one… anyone heard of Arrows?
6 – Of course, blame Turkey… after all, being pro-US and pro-Israel, they just have to be evil, eh?
7 – Given the duration of the Marshall plan, it wouldn’t take a genius to work out that one.
8 – The jury is out. No doubt that when the evidence is adduced, the left will smear it as a ‘cheap election ploy’. After all, being liberal means never having to admit that you are sorry.
9 – Nice try.
10 – Not surprising, given that the way the dominant Sunnis treated minorities (on the whole). What a travesty that the US wants to give rights to the Kurds and Shi’ites, eh?
11 – Wrong, basically false. The US forces in Iraq are like jihadi flypaper… Keeping them busy in Iraq has no doubt prevented numerous attacks abroad.
12 – Self-fulfilling prophecy. Any new leadership will just be deemed ‘non-functioning’ as soon as there is any problem.
13 – So far is looking good. There are numerous signs of M-E despots allowing regional elections and coming clean on WMD programs. If the war on Iraq did nothing else, it removed a seriously brutal regime from power and revealed the WMD programs of Libya, Iran and ‘D’PRK, as well as the complicity of Pakistan.
14 – May be proven correct if Kerry is elected.
Lewis,
When was #11 (flypaper) advanced as a cause for this war? And who said that “numerous” attacks abroad have been prevented? Throughout the from 93-01, AQ and sympathizers managed approx less than 1 major attack per year (93-WTC, 96-Khobar, 98-EAfrica, 00-COLE, 01-WTC/Pentagon). However, AQ attacks in Bali, Riyadh (2-3 times), Tunis, Istanbul, Casablanca, and now Madrid show a new strength and operational reach – and that includes their possible participation in the Iraqi insurgency.
Jihadi flypaper? Show me the proof. It is impossible to prove the negative that is the “flypaper strategy”. And the 150 foriegners among 12000 Coalition detainees in Iraq just doesn’t cut it for me.
Serving Patriot – I never suggested that it was a reason for the war. It is just a collateral benefit. Note that on the whole recent attacks have been against ‘soft’ targets. The point remains that after Afghanistan there has not been a major attack against a US target.
As a postscript to my last point, there has been one significant successful minor terrorist attack on US civillians – that being the attack in Gaza on the Fulbright representatives. Note that Arafat just released the suspects.
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1079263938317
… and if you believe that the Palestinian Authority doesn’t know who killed the US reps, I have a bridge to sell you.
An excellent critique of Michael Ignatieff’s article. There’s a pretty simple description of it: Damage Control.
Ignatieff’s article seeks to limit the bounds of debate, making sure “liberals” don’t stray too far in their assessment, such that they continue the American exceptionalist agenda – i.e only “we” can solve the problems of lawlessness “we” created. The one thing that must not be questioned is that the U.S. must remain in Iraq.
Off the agenda is to examine the popular Iraqi overthrow of British installed Kings. Off the agenda is to examine South Asian history, the peaceful ejection of the British in India, the peaceful replacement of General Zia in Pakistan, the peaceful removal of Marcos in the Philippines, Suharto in Indonesia, Ceaucescu in Romania.
There were many better ways to remove the Hussein regime other than resorting to a war for Halliburton and many people (15 million on 2/15/2003) spoke out.
But the problem for the self-described liberals is that as soon as grass-roots democracy starts to take hold and the people themselves can see the inadequacies of representation, it’s starts to threaten the Republic. The pulled thread starts to unravel the sweater. The more that localised decision making is exposed to actually be politically powerful, the more the oligarchs lose their grip.
8. We will find no significant amounts of usable WMD; we will NOT see significant news coverage of what actual WMD are discovered, and the issue will fade away over time basically true
8 – The jury is out. No doubt that when the evidence is adduced, the left will smear it as a ‘cheap election ploy’. After all, being liberal means never having to admit that you are sorry.
Don’t believe the prediction above, examine the comments of Scott Ritter, David Kay, Hans Blix (particularly his 3/15/2004 interview at NYU) – all professionals, not to mention the other 1397 Iraqi Survey Group members still searching after a year for any sign of WMD.
Who are you going to believe, the professionals or the politicians (I include the entire executive branch here)? Biological and Chemical WMDs have shelf lives of months, not years, and nuclear WMDs were even more closely scrutinised than the BioChem.
That terrorists could obtain WMD is always a threat, one that the Spanish made the intelligent decision to concentrate their homeland security and multilateralist engagement with Europe towards, rather than propping up the no-bid plunder of Iraq.
Leigh
Whom should I believe?
– Hans ‘the bureacrat from Belgium’ Blix, who gave Iraq a clean bill of health in 1991 only to have been categorically proven wrong. Iraq was, in fact, about a year away from producing a nuclear device.
– Scott ‘thanks for the film funding, now take me to your daughter’ Ritter, who deliberately concealed evidence of his knowledge of the children’s prison in Baghdad to serve his own agenda (see Sept 14, 2002 TIME)
or Kay?
Of the three, only Kay has any real credibility. Note that he has acknowledged evidence that WMD parts were shipped to Syria immediately before the war. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/01/25/wirq25.xml&sSheet=/news/2004/01/25/ixnewstop.html
It will be very interesting to find out just how many WMDs or parts were shipped to Syria (or elsewhere).
Most of the world believed that Saddam had WMDs. The real debate at the time was as to which approach to take in relation to Saddam.
The recent evidence of oil concessions for many of the anti-war crowd and their cohorts indicates that a significant aspect of the anti-war movement may well have been all about oil (not to mention that France & Russia had the biggest stakes in Iraqi oil contracts).
The truth will come out. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that it will all be flushed out before the next election. But as to your question, I would rather believe Bush, who has followed through on his word regardless of the popularity of the outcome, than career diplomats/bureaucrats (particularly those on the take).
What is tragic about Kay’s reports is that he is of the opinion that it was not Bush, but the intelligence community who got it so wrong. He suggests that Bush properly relied on the intelligence that he had received and if any apologies are due it is from the CIA, etc. to Bush.
The same people who got the threat wrong on September 11, may have gotten it wrong on Iraq. The consequences of not acting on the limited intelligence the first time resulted in 3000 deaths in the US. The consequences of not acting on the intelligence the second time (if it had been correct) could have been far worse.
You can fault Bush for his arrogance, his close ties to the Saudis and plenty of other things. But on this one, I think he made the right decision on the basis of the information that he had.
Lewis,
Please provide even one shred of proof on your claims that Iraqi WMD were sent abroad to Syria or terror groups. Which groups? Overwhelming proof now exists, including from Kay’s own mouth, that Iraq did not have, nor transfer, such weapons.
You continue to parrot a fantasy talking point that is advanced soleely to frighten US citizens into supporting another adventure into a “recalcitrant” state. Why we would go after a nation that has been assisting us in the larger GWOT, as Syria has, is beyond me. Unfortunately, you’re fantasy adventure will have to wait a long time as we are stuck in the sands of Iraq with substantial portions of our military.
When will you will wake up and smell the coffee?
Serving Patriot – One of the complexities of the Middle East is that it is often possible to act for both sides at the same time.
For example, Saudi Arabia was an ally of the US when it helped Imad Mugniyeh escape from US’s clutches.
For example, since the signing of the Oslo agreements, Arafat has been talking peace to the Western media, while at the same time comparing the Oslo agreements to the treaty of Hudaybiyyah or alluding to his ‘two-phase’ approach when speaking in Arabic (including well before the intifada).
So no, it does not surprise me at all that Syria could be ‘assisting’ the US while at the same time abetting its enemies.
The point that Kay keeps on iterating is that the intelligence was so flawed that it is pretty much impossible to know what happened. He has never gone on the record to state categorically that WMDs never existed nor that they were never shipped to Syria or Iran. But thanks for your 2c anyway.