Oxford survey on Iraqi opinion, contd.

I just finished writing the last post, which highlighted the recent survey of Iraqi opinion carried out by Oxford Research International, when the good folks there at ORI emailed me over a bundle of docs summarizing their methods and findings.
These docs all carry imposing copyright symbols. If they hadn’t, I could have posted them on my website and just linked to ’em from here. (I feel very ambivalent about all issues of intellectual “property”.) I also note that the survey was carried out jointly between the (for-profit) ORI and the Sociology Dept at Oxford University. Shouldn’t a publicly-funded university make its findings freely available to the public?
As it is, I’ve decided to make “fair use” of what ORI sent to me, and shall summarize what I think are the most significant findings. For background on the survey (timing [Oct-Nov], sample-size [3,244], etc) you’ll have to read my last post, Iraq’s Battle of the Ayatollahs.
So, findings, running rapidly down the summary that ORI sent me:
On contentment:

People in Iraq are not particularly unhappy with their lives (average score [I think this is the score for happiness, not unhappiness? HC] 5.7 on a scale of 1-10). Historically, life satisfaction in 71 countries around the world stood at an average mean score of 6.8, with some countries scoring as low as 3.7 (Moldova) and 4.0 (Ukraine). Neighbouring Turkey scored 6.3, South Africa and South Korea 6.0

Income:

Monthly net household income averages US$124. Less than 2% have incomes above US$500. 22% have to make do with US$50 per month or less

What people say is important in their lives:

Family (98%), religion (94) and work (83) lead the field of ?very important? life areas. Leisure time is not of great importance at this stage; politics, to most is ?not at all important? (both genders: 36; men: 29; women: 43)

Trust in others [This is a really important and sensitive question, and I’m glad they asked it. I identified the breakdown of general social trust in post-Baath Iraq as a key issue as long ago as April 12– see this post on JWN.] ORI’s findings:

Social trust in the country is eroded: nearly 90% of respondents say ‘you have to be very careful in dealing with [other] people’. Other than their immediate families, on aggregate scores people feel close to religious groups (62% ), their friends (27), and their relatives (28)

Confidence in institutions:

In contrast to all other institutions, Iraq’s religious leaders command the trust of the people (70% confidence )
People have no confidence in US/UK forces (79%) and the Coalition Provisional Authority — CPA (73). 8% say they have a ‘great deal’ of faith in US/UK troops. They also mistrust Iraqi political parties (78). While still largely mistrusted, the UN scores relatively best among non Iraqi institutions (35% confidence)
Split trust is handed to the New Iraqi Army, ministries in Baghdad, the Governing Council, the Iraqi Media Network TV, and the police. Local leaders (Mukhtars) receive a 54% vote of confidence

Views of the past 12 months:

When asked to report in their own words the best and worst experience of the past 12 months, Iraqis overwhelmingly agree on two answers, dwarfing all other responses: the ‘best thing’ people say was the ‘demise of Saddam’s regime’ (42% ); the ‘worst thing’, ‘the war, bombings and defeat’ (35)
Interestingly, there appears no obvious link between best and worst thing. The very troops which liberated Iraqis from Saddam are the most mistrusted institution in Iraq today
In the past 12 months, 14% bemoan [?] the loss of a loved one, 8% the loss of security, 5% the experience of Saddam’s regime and less than 1% its collapse

The next 12 months (also on free-response questions):

For the next 12 months, people overwhelmingly worry about their security and the spectre of drifting into chaos (36%) or civil war (15). Another 15% say that ‘occupation forces not leaving Iraq’ is the worst thing which could happen, while less than 1% worry about occupation forces actually leaving

I bolded that last set of findings because this is an issue that well-meaning people in western countries worry a lot about. “What if we call for a withdrawal of the occupation forces and the country then slides into chaos?”
Actually, I recall exactly that same question being a big concern with respect to the Israelis’ extended occupation presence in Lebanon in 1982-85. A situation, I might add, where there was far more reason to be actively concerned about the prospect for non-governmental inter-sectarian killings in the absence of any large-scale regular military forces. (Not that the Israelis totally prevented inter-sectarian killings in the areas under their controlk, but that’s another question.)
Back then, after the Israelis did make two staged withdrawals in that time period–though not yet, alas, back to their own border–there was some score-settling that ensued between the Druze mountaineers and the Maronites who had been the Israelis’ local toadies. But not nearly as much as some of the apologists for the Israeli occupation had foreseen.
In the present discussion re the US-UK occupation presence in Iraq (as too, I admit, back in the 1980s in lebanon) far too little attention is actually paid to the views of the indigenous people of the occupied areas themselves. Do they see the occupation presence as one that contributes to, or detracts from, their sense of their own security? For well-meaning people elsewhere, I submit, that should be an extremely important piece of evidence. I am delighted that ORI has been able to provide this evidence.
I note, in addition, that these last responses were given spontaneously in answer to the quite open-ended question, “What would be the worst thing that could happen to you in the next 12 months?”
Actually, I don’t think ORI presented the results on this question very accurately in the “Executive summary” quoted above. When I went back to the tabulated results for the questions–which they had also helpfully sent to me– I found the following aggregated responses to that question.
Respondents were asked to name only one thing as the worst they could imagine happening in the coming 12 months. 36.2% said something along the lines of “No security/fear of chaos.” 23.3% said something that was aggregated as “Personal worries.” 15.0% said something about “The occupation forces will not leave Iraq”. 14.5% mentioned a “Fear of civil war/internal trouble.” 5.0% said “Return of saddam/former regime”– interesting, that figure, and actually lower than I would have expected. So maybe it’s not all intimidation by Saddamists that’s making Iraqis oppose the USUK forces? 3.3% said “Lack of Iraqi political control”. 1.3% mentioned no basic services like water or electricity. 0.9% identified concerns not otherwise aggregated. And 0.6% (even smaller than the 1% figure given in the Exec Summary) said “American forces leaving Iraq” would be the worst thing they could imagine…
Other signifcant findings:
“The number one priority for Iraqis is regaining public security (67%).”
But how about this one, which is extremely relevant for my project on how societies choose to deal with legacies of atrocious violence: Respondents were asked two questions about policy priorities for the year ahead. In the first, which yielded the above result, they were read a list of ten possible “priorities” and asked to identify and rank three of them.
In the second asking of the question about priorities, the same list of ten possible policy priorities was read out, and respondents were required to name just one which they considered to be “no priority at all”.
In both lists, the issue of “Dealing with members of the previous government” was one of the ten possible policy areas. 91.2% of respondents identified this as the one policy area they considered to have zero priority.
On first reading, I was very surprised and very delighted to read this result. Much of my work questions the priority that western-based human-rights organizations puts on dealing (punitively) with perpetrators of past atrocities. I have found that amnesties are a valuable and essential tool in building the kind of peace that enables societies to escape from cycles of violence and to make the perpetration of future atrocities literally unthinkable. (Check out the Mozambique posts on this blog…)
However, after being delighted by this finding– which surely opens the way for people to start brainstorming suitable, sulha-based approaches to dealing with the sequelae of past atrocities in Iraq!– I did have one small lingering question about this part of the ORI survey. What exact Arabic word was used for “dealing with” the members of the past government? Certainly, in English, “dealing with” is open to any number of interpretations, and not merely that to which most western rights activists would almost instinctively leap (= dealing punitively with). Anyway, I guess we’ll have to wait and see…
I have to wrap this up quickly. How much easier it would have been to simply post the whole text!
Other notable findings, then: Seemingly a generally low interest in politics– or rather, a low level of willingness to admit to such to earnest researcher standing on doorstep with clipboard in hand (and with accreditation letter from “Oxford University” on top of the clipboard??), which is not quite the same thing…
But, moving along to politics in general:

No [legitimate –HC] role in Iraqi politics is granted to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) headed by Paul Bremer (64% disagree with the proposition that “Iraq now needs this”), and people are also sure that Iraqi military leaders have no political future (74%)
People are virtually split about the prospect of a UN transition government with a small majority (54%) disagreeing with the idea. Whatever the individual choices, Iraqis appear to want to be ruled by Iraqis
Forced to choose only one form of government in 12 months time, respondents choose democracy (35%) over a strong Iraqi leader (29%). [A govt made up mainly of religious leaders scored 12% here; the present Iraqi Governing Council, 8.3%; a UN transitional government, 5.0%; and the CPA got 1.1%].
95% of Iraqis do not think that democracy is a Western construct ‘which will not work in Iraq’ People also reject suggestions that democracies are bad at running the economy (83%), are ‘indecisive’ (75) or cannot maintain order (74). In fact, people agreed that democracy ‘may have its problems but is better than any other form of government’ (84)