THE SAD OLD CANARD OF

THE SAD OLD CANARD OF ‘CREDIBILITY’ (again): A blogger called Sean-Paul, who posts to The Agonist, has produced a four-part listing of the possible risks and rewards involved in the US invading or not invading Iraq.
The listing is interesting, though very provincial and US-centric. Sean-Paul seems to have given no thought to the idea that the US, as a country and as a citizenry, might actually have a huge interest in the robustness of the global system as a whole.
He also seems not to have much real clue at all about the dynamics of Middle Eastern countries, as evidenced by the list he gives of “possible rewards” of a U.S. invasion, most of which are pure pie-in-the-sky. (“Iraq becomes a cost free linchpin of US operations in the region,” etc.)
I don’t know who Sean-Paul is, and he doesn’t give us any real clues. What he reads like on the site is an earnest young man trying desperately to sound wise beyond his years. As when, in the first two of the “risks” he describes in “not invading”, come: “1. Loss of credibility–(Liberals too often deride this. It is a very serious issue. [Scratch chin here.]) 2. It would be seen as a defeat of the US and extremists would be emboldened.”
Firstly, just how again are these two items different from each other?
Secondly, the “credibility” argument is and always has been the last refuge of failing policies. “Credibility” is what any individual, institution, or government makes of it. The policies of the Bush administration over the past 25 months have not exactly built up much credibility with anyone at all, with the possible exception of Ariel Sharon. (Anyone remember April 4, 2002, when the Prez called on Sharon to “withdraw immediately” from the Area A portions of the West Bank and Gaza? They’re still there… Anyone remember Kyoto, or the ABM treaty, or a host of other issues on which Dubya squandered our country’s global credibility like there was no tomorrow. And now, it even seems possible that there may not be.)
“Credibility” is what warhawks finally end up huffing and puffing about when all rational justifications for their policies have disappeared. (Lebanon, 1983, for example. I know. I was there.)
Let’s face it, even now– though this current war has already started in some little dribbles and drabbles here and there, the Prez could still swing it to a halt if he wanted to. He is the Commander-in-Chief. And if he decided, after examining both all the options and his own consceince that he wanted to explore alternatives to war, he’d find thousands of capable and experienced people very eager to help him to do so.
He could “declare victory”, by saying that he really does want to give the U.N. and inspections a chance; by supporting stringent benchmarks such as those Blix is rumored to be proposing. He could note that it has been because of his own steadfastness that the inspections have shown the progress that they’ve shown already; he could invite leaders from around the world to join him in brainstorming on how to build a secure and conflict-free Middle East that is free from all weapons of mass destruction… (That would be a good goal to aim for, wouldn’t it?)
And many wonderful, capable people would scramble over each other to help Dubya climb down from this terrible limb of violence onto which he seems to have hoisted himself.
The way I see it, Ari Fleischer is such a very accomplished flack– and there are others there, too– that they could tell the world that this whole train of events has already strengthened the United States’ global credibility, so it’s now okay for the U.S. forces to shift to holding posture; and in a sense, this can become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Let’s hear no more about this hollow old argument of “credibility”. How “credible” will the policy and its authors look if the Prez allows this war to go ahead and the whole regional order in the Greater Middle East and beyond comes crashing down around our heads?
(A hint: Vietnam.)