THE BRITS SHOULD KNOW BETTER:

THE BRITS SHOULD KNOW BETTER:  The strategic geography of Mesopotamia may seem distant, perplexing, and “exotic” to many in the United States. But, with all due respect to the British military, they should have known better than to let the Bushites take them along for the promised “cakewalk” into Iraq.

The Brits should have known better.  Actually, many Brits do.  Many Brits learned in their (our) history books about the problems encountered by the expeditionary force sent into Mesopotamia by the authorities in British-ruled India.

Those who weren’t “lucky” enough to read those books can find out all about it on a good-looking site called First WorldWar.com (ironic subhead– “The war to end all wars”.)  The site even has a special section on the “Mesopotamian front” that lets you click down all the major engagement from the capture of Basra in November 1914 through the capture of Tikrit three years later, and finally, the Battle of Sharqat in October-November 1918.

Basra took the Anglo-Indian force 16days to capture from the Turks.  We learn that,  “In the face of distinctly unfavourable attacking conditions – heavy rainfall and its consequent mud bath, in addition to heat mirages – the British force found progress initially difficult to come by until the use of 18-pounder artillery succeeded in scattering defenders, most of whom escaped under protection of a heat mirage, unable to be pursued by cavalry in such thick mud.

But finally the Brits made it into the city:

In taking Basra the British-led force suffered under 500 casualties and the Turks in excess of 1,000.  Crucially the British had secured and ensured a continuation of oil supplies in the Middle East: a matter of paramount importance.

[Oil supplies were a factor because of the huge refineries in the “Persian” city of Abadan, just across the Shatt al-Arab from Basra.]

After that, slowly–very slowly– the British-Indian force plodded northward.  The battle reports covering the next 18 months speak repeatedly of problems with supply lines, terrible physical conditions, confusion about the loyalties of various tribes, etc etc.  Plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose, eh?

Then, in April 1916, came the First Battle of Kut al-Amara. By now, the Brits, who’d been trying to pursue an aggressive strategy of “forward defense” found their garrison of 10,000 troops in that eastern-Mesopotamian city besieged.  They brought up a 30,000-man force to try to relieve it, but in a series of engagements the Turks inflicted heavy losses. “1,200 British casualties were incurred alone on 6 April, with additional losses suffered the next day and on 9 April.”

By April 22, the losses among the relieving force had reached 23,000.

“Accordingly Sir Charles Townshend [the British commander of the Kut garrison ~HC], having consulted with higher authority, surrendered unconditionally on 29 April 1916 having failed to purchase parole for his 10,000 men with a